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INTRODUCTION
As a wave of massive corporate scandals overwhelms our
lives, calls to hold corporate boards accountable grow louder each
day.1 Just this fall, hackers rummaged through Equifax’s records to obtain financial information for 143 million Americans.2
Customers of Wells Fargo, the nation’s third largest bank, saw
their hard-earned money routed to 3.5 million fictitious accounts, frittered away on frivolous fees, and wasted on unwanted
car insurance.3 Auto-manufacturers General Motors and
Volkswagen made billion-dollar payments after failing to uncover critical defects in auto parts, resulting in many deaths and
injuries4 and environmental damage.5 Yahoo, the one-time Internet giant, announced that over 3 billion email accounts were
compromised by Russian hackers in the largest security breach
in Internet history.6 And following a crude awakening to widespread sexual harassment in the workplace,7 many corporations
are viewed as tolerating repeated violations by powerful and

1. See, e.g., Emily Flitter et al., How Wells Fargo and Federal Reserve
Struck Deal to Hold Bank’s Board Accountable, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/business/wells-fargo-fed-board-directors
-penalties.html (describing negotiations between the Federal Reserve and the
board of Wells Fargo after the Federal Reserve imposed sanctions on Wells
Fargo for fraudulent charges to customers).
2. See Ron Lieber & Stacy Cowley, Trying to Stem Fallout from Breach,
Equifax Replaces C.E.O., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/09/26/business/equifax-ceo.html.
3. See Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo’s Year of Scandal Stretches On, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargos-year-of-scandal
-stretches-on-1504863001; Gretchen Morgenson, Wells Fargo Forced Unwanted
Auto Insurance on Borrowers, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes
.com/2017/07/27/business/wells-fargo-unwanted-auto-insurance.html.
4. See Richard Read, GM’s Ignition Switch Findings: 124 Deaths, 275 Injuries, WASH. POST (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/cars/gms
-ignition-switch-findings-124-deaths-275-injuries/2015/08/25/2ad3a7d4-4b44
-11e5-80c2-106ea7fb80d4_story.html.
5. See Shannon Hall, VW Causes Small but Irreversible Environmental
Damage, SCI. AM. (Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
vw-scandal-causes-small-but-irreversible-environmental-damage.
6. Yahoo Provides Notice to Additional Users Affected by Previously Disclosed 2013 Data Theft, OATH (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.oath.com/press/yahoo
-provides-notice-to-additional-users-affected-by-previously (summarizing Yahoo’s announcement that “all user accounts were affected by the August 2013
data theft,” instead of only the one billion accounts previously disclosed).
7. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, #MeToo Has Done What the Law Could
Not, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/opinion/
metoo-law-legal-system.html.
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popular figures. With repercussions of such immense scale, policymakers8 and the broader public are left wondering whether
corporate boards are simply incompetent or ultimately complicit.9
This critical distinction matters not only in the court of public opinion, but also in the courts of law. Under the most common
legal bases, which we discuss below, mere incompetence would
exculpate an otherwise well-intentioned board, whereas failure
to respond to glaring problems results in liability. To differentiate between these two outcomes, our legal system has increasingly turned to companies’ internal monitoring efforts through
their compliance apparatus. For over a decade, federal regulators and criminal authorities have directed companies to intensify their compliance efforts, often in return for more favorable
regulatory treatment.10 The response has been swift and impressive. Compliance departments in most public companies today
engage hundreds of employees on average, and retain thousands
of staff in highly regulated industries such as finance.11 With expanding firepower at their disposal, the heads of legal and compliance departments find themselves in an increasingly elevated
position within the corporate hierarchy, having gained a seat
among top managers and a direct reporting avenue to the
board.12
But while companies have committed unprecedented resources to build up their compliance operations, the results of
their efforts are very much in doubt. Some corporate law scholars question whether in-house officers are well placed to supervise their superiors, such as the CEO and the board.13 Others
8. See Gretchen Morgenson, Wells Fargo Borrower Got Unneeded Insurance, and Ruined Credit, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/08/18/business/wells-fargo-loan-auto-insurance.html.
9. See David Gelles, ‘You Should Be Fired’: Wells Fargo C.E.O. Faces Blistering Attacks From Senators, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes
.com/2017/10/03/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-ceo-senate-hearing.html.
10. See infra text accompanying Part I.A.1.
11. See Jill Treanor, JP Morgan Chase Hires 3,000 New Staff in Its Compliance Department, GUARDIAN (Sept. 17, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/
business/2013/sep/17/jpmorgan-banking (describing the infamous “London
Whale” debacle, where JP Morgan hired 3000 new compliance staff and reassigned 1000 employees for a total increase of 4000 staff members); see also Press
Release, Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Bank Reports First Quarter 2017 Net Income of €575 Million (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.db.com/newsroom_news/
2017q1-media-release.pdf (reporting that Deutsche Bank increased its compliance staff by over 2000 employees after recent failures).
12. See infra text accompanying Part I.B.
13. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the
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mistrust company employees as monitors, arguing that their insider perspective and loyalty to their firm will prevent them from
seeing fraud and wrongdoing.14 Still others have dismissed compliance as institutionally ill-suited to the board-centric edifice of
corporate law.15 Perhaps the harshest critics view compliance as
a box-checking exercise, too formalistic and weak to uncover corporate malfeasance.16 Overall, current scholarship on compliance from a variety of perspectives reaches mostly negative conclusions.
While we share many of these concerns, our bottom line is
considerably more optimistic. We come to a different outcome because we uncover a different pathway through which legal and
compliance officers can wield influence that is not emphasized in
prior research. We agree with existing scholarship that in-house
legal and compliance experts rarely have the means or bargaining power to command top management or board members to
stop violating the law. But expecting them to do so would be misplaced. Rather, we argue that legal and compliance officers have
great power because they can alter board members’ incentives,
and ensure that board members become aware of information
they might prefer to ignore. If the chief legal or compliance officer chooses to inform the board of a critical problem, it becomes
much harder for directors to do nothing and still meet the good
faith requirements of our laws. This internal report can flip the
board’s state of mind from blissful, even if negligent, ignorance
to stark awareness. Hence, legal and compliance officers’ hidden
power lies in their ability to trigger board action by formally notifying the board of a problem, or alternatively shielding the
board from this formal notification and allowing board members
to preserve the veneer of ignorance.
This hidden power of compliance, we argue, sprang up unexpectedly over the last decade from parallel case law developments in Delaware fiduciary duty jurisprudence, federal securities regulation, and personal liability for compliance officers. We
trace these doctrinal developments to explain how a renewed
SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1296 (2003); see also Robert C. Bird & Stephen
Kim Park, The Domains of Corporate Counsel in an Era of Compliance, 53 AM.
BUS. L.J. 203, 204–05 (2016).
14. See Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside
Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 988 (2005).
15. See Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and
Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 590 (2008).
16. See Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 933, 941 (2017).
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emphasis on evidence of awareness boosted the standing of legal
and compliance officers in the eyes of the board, while also
threatening board members with liability if they fail.17 We then
reveal how this works in practice by analyzing the interactions
between the board and its legal and compliance officers through
evidence released in four major recent scandals: the GM ignition
switch scandal, the Washington Mutual mortgage meltdown, the
Yahoo security breach, and the Wells Fargo fake accounts scandal.18
When the Delaware Supreme Court first confirmed, in its
landmark 2006 Stone v. Ritter opinion,19 that board members
would be liable for failing to monitor misconduct only if found to
be acting in bad faith, much of legal academia burst out in despair.20 To meet such a demanding evidentiary standard, plaintiffs would need to provide unambiguous evidence of the directors’ and officers’ states of mind, thought notoriously hard to
obtain. For critics, Delaware had just handed out another victory
to boards. Even fervid advocates of the discretion Stone affords
to boards did not question that proving bad faith would be truly
cumbersome.21
To upend this widely shared belief in the literature, we
closely analyze post-Stone jurisprudence from the last ten years
in Part II, detailing the facets of bad faith in the various prongs
of Delaware’s monitoring doctrine. Our argument here is not
that Delaware law has turned out more generous than critics
feared. Rather, we argue that the precise line that Delaware jurisprudence has drawn around bad faith allows legal and compliance personnel to formulate their communications with the
board in a manner that can either expose it to liability or shield
it from it. The dramatic increase in monitoring resources since
17. See infra Parts II–IV.
18. See infra Part V.
19. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364 (Del.
2006).
20. See, e.g., Megan W. Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement of Directors’ Duties,
48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 271, 307 (2014). See generally Jennifer Arlen, The Story
of Allis-Chalmers, Caremark, and Stone: Directors’ Evolving Duty to Monitor,
in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 323 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009) (arguing that the
importance of Caremark may have been exaggerated); Eric J. Pan, Rethinking
The Board’s Duty to Monitor: A Critical Assessment of the Delaware Doctrine,
38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 209 (2011) (viewing Delaware doctrine as too narrow).
21. See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629 (2010) (underlining Chancellor Allen’s intention to avoid subjecting directors to broad liability).
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Stone has positioned legal and compliance officers to bridge the
informational gap and provide the detailed reports required by
courts to prove bad faith. For example, internal compliance reports have helped shareholders win hefty settlements in cases
about illegal drug promotion against the boards of Pfizer,22 the
pharmaceutics giant, and Allergan,23 which produces Botox.
Similarly, internal reports documenting failures and gaps in
companies’ safety, risk, and compliance systems have aided
plaintiffs in their wins against boards in diverse industries such
as finance24 and mining.25
As we explain in Part III below, the gravity of internal reports for board liability becomes clearer when taking into account parallel developments in federal securities case law, and
in particular under Rule 10b-5, the most popular basis for class
actions. According to 10b-5, a corporate officer commits fraud
only if she issues faulty disclosure with scienter, i.e. she is aware
of such faults or, at least reckless in not recognizing them.26 In
2007, just a year after Stone, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Tellabs v. Makor raised the evidentiary standard for successfully
pleading scienter, effectively requiring hard evidence of awareness or recklessness.27 As a result, the lines demarcating scienter and bad faith essentially coincide, as courts themselves have
recognized.28 Consequently, securities plaintiffs often pore over
internal records of communications between boards and their legal and compliance officers to unearth evidence of scienter. Securities class actions have traditionally far exceeded fiduciary
duty claims in terms of awards won, and are recently reaching
new heights.29 Thus, interactions between legal and compliance
officers and the board have never been more critical.
Compliance officers have not only gained greater influence
due to their role in communicating with corporate boards, but
have also been held personally liable when they failed to do so.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 224–31.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 211–20.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 221–23.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 231–41.
26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018).
27. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007)
(holding that although the evidence need not be a “smoking gun,” it must be
“cogent and compelling” in light of other explanations).
28. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006).
29. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS 2017
MIDYEAR ASSESSMENT 1 (2017), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/
Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Filings-2017-Midyear-Assessment.
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In a highly controversial move, the SEC sanctioned the Chief
Compliance Officers in financial giants Blackrock and SFX for
tolerating gaps in their compliance systems, even though they
were not aware of illegal conduct occurring due to these gaps.30
In another example, the U.S. Attorney’s Office brought charges
for obstruction of justice against a Volkswagen legal counsel,
whose vague instructions for record keeping gave the signal to
employees to destroy evidence right around the emissions scandal revelations.31 Although the growing threat of liability
against legal and compliance personnel has the profession up in
arms, it eventually strengthens their hand vis-à-vis the board,
as we argue in Part IV. By pointing to potential personal liability, legal and compliance heads are empowered to resist any undue pressure to turn a blind eye.
These developments in Delaware corporate law, federal securities law, and personal liability for legal and compliance officers are transforming the legal treatment of corporate misconduct
in practice. The fines, payouts to plaintiffs, and other sanctions
resulting from corporate debacles nowadays are negotiated in
light of the evidence trail against management and boards left
behind by legal and compliance officers. To analyze this dynamic
in practice, we present case studies focusing on four mega-scandals: the General Motors ignition switch failure, the Washington
Mutual collapse during the financial crisis, the security breach
in Yahoo, and Wells Fargo’s fake accounts fiasco.32 While legal
and compliance personnel are at the heart of the inquiry in all
cases, their interaction with the board in each setting is different, changing the liability outcome. Some interactions effectively
shield the board from liability, as critics feared, but other interactions expose both the board and legal and compliance personnel to legal risks, in twists that prior literature did not predict.
We present four different categories of interactions, which we
term as follows for ease of reference: untraceable, traceable, interrupted, and incomplete.33
Our first category, “untraceable” communications, includes
settings where no evidentiary trail connects the heads of legal
and compliance departments with ongoing violations or red
flags, and no communication with the board happens on record.
With no hard evidence of awareness, the board is off the hook, as
30.
31.
32.
33.

See infra text accompanying notes 290–95.
See infra text accompanying notes 300–06.
See infra Part V.
Id.
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was the case in the General Motors (GM) ignition switch scandal.
Despite settling over 100 lawsuits pointing to a potential mechanical failure, lower-tier in-house lawyers, apparently content
with the small payouts to plaintiffs they secured, failed to elevate the issue to the chief legal counsel’s attention.34 As a result
of the ensuing delay in uncovering the problem, hundreds suffered death or injury, and the company paid billions in fines, settlements, and other sanctions.35 This negative outcome has predictably monopolized academic assessments of compliance, since
it absolves both board and legal personnel despite their disastrous omissions. We bring to light the other scenarios below,
where the outcome for corporate actors is less favorable.
Our second category, “traceable” communications, represents the polar opposite of the one above, with on-record interactions between the board and legal and compliance officers, who
provide well-informed reports of employees’ illegal acts or red
flags. Such a clear evidentiary link between corporate failures
and the board’s state of mind is what the architects of compliance
are hoping to achieve. For an illustration of this theoretical ideal
on the ground, we turn to the failure of Washington Mutual
(WaMu), the largest savings and loan association that collapsed
during the 2007 financial crisis with assets of about $300 billion.36 WaMu’s board pursued an aggressive mortgage origination strategy, despite repeated warnings by successive compliance officers that the mortgage documentation prevented them
from meeting, or even accurately assessing, the institution’s risk
levels as required by law.37 The resulting settlement between the
board and the FDIC, who took over the floundering institution,
included a rare out-of-pocket payment by board members.38
As our next two categories demonstrate, interactions between the board and legal and compliance personnel are not al-

34. See ANTON R. VALUKAS, REPORT TO BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF GENERAL
MOTORS COMPANY REGARDING IGNITION SWITCH RECALLS 1 (2014) [hereinafter
VALUKAS REPORT], https://www.aieg.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Valukas
-report-on-gm-redacted2.pdf.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 324–29.
36. See Robin Sidel et al., WaMu Is Seized, Sold Off to J.P. Morgan, In
Largest Failure in U.S. Banking History, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 26, 2008), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB122238415586576687.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 354–58.
38. See Kevin M. LaCroix, A Closer Look at the WaMu FDIC Settlement,
D&O DIARY (Dec. 19, 2011), https://www.dandodiary.com/2011/12/articles/
failed-banks/a-closer-look-at-the-wamu-fdic-settlement.
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ways as clear-cut as in our first two examples. In our third setting, which we term “interrupted” communications, information
about underlying violations reaches top legal and compliance officers, who never communicate it officially to the board, perhaps
out of loyalty as critics fear. Although this interruption protects
the board from liability, it can generate risks for legal and compliance personnel who may be seen as engineering it, as in the
Yahoo example we discuss. In what became the largest cybersecurity breach in history, Russian hackers compromised over 3
billion accounts, selling personal financial information online for
financial crime or espionage.39 Although red flags had reached
the chief legal officer of Yahoo, an independent investigation
found that he neither pursued a full-scale investigation nor
alerted the board officially.40 When revelations of the hack engulfed the board, the independent investigation documented the
red flags and faulted the chief legal officer for not following
through.41 Protecting itself behind this lack of communication,
the board publicly blamed the chief legal counsel, who promptly
resigned.42 He now also finds himself embroiled in related litigation.43 According to industry commentators and plaintiffs alike,
the board used the chief legal counsel as a scapegoat.44
In our final setting, where communications were “incomplete,” legal and compliance personnel are aware of apparent red
flags, but instead of turning a blind eye they opt for half-hearted
investigations and vague communications to the board. From the
outside, it may seem like the compliance apparatus is humming
along so as to justify the board’s good faith, but no incriminating
information ever comes to the surface. If this was the strategy in
39. See Yahoo Provides Notice, supra note 6.
40. Yahoo! Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 47 (Mar. 1, 2017) [hereinafter
Yahoo 2016 10-K], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1011006/
000119312517065791/d293630d10k.htm; see also infra Part V.C.
41. Yahoo 2016 10-K, supra note 40 (“[T]he legal team had sufficient information to warrant substantial further inquiry . . . and they did not sufficiently
pursue it.”).
42. Id.
43. See Yahoo Accused of Mismanaging Millions in Humanitarian Trust
Funds Intended for Chinese Political Dissidents, COHEN MILSTEIN (Apr. 11,
2017), https://www.cohenmilstein.com/update/yahoo-accused-mismanaging
-millions-humanitarian-trust-funds-intended-chinese-political (alleging that
Yahoo executives, including Bell, turned a blind eye to the misuse of funds).
44. See David Ruiz, Silicon Valley GCs Defend Ron Bell; Say He’s the Fall
Guy, RECORDER (Mar. 2, 2017), http://www.law.com/therecorder/almID/
1202780410330 (observing that many of Ron Bell’s colleagues supported him,
even after his very public resignation).
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the Wells Fargo fake accounts scandal, it clearly did not work.
Opening fictitious accounts was so widespread among bank employees that even the press featured stories about misconduct.45
For years, the chief legal and compliance officers watched over
underwhelming attempts to collect information, hesitated to interview top bank executives, and submitted inconclusive reports
to the board.46 When the scandal erupted, those lackluster efforts and the shreds of evidence left behind engulfed all corporate actors. Top executives and compliance officers stepped
down, had their compensation clawed back, and found themselves targeted by private plaintiffs and regulators.47 To top it
all off, the Federal Reserve took the unprecedented move of
pushing for a removal of all board members, illustrating that
failures of that extent are hard to tolerate.48
We develop this argument in the paragraphs below. We first
document the revolutionary growth of compliance departments
in the last decade and the deep skepticism of legal academia towards that development. We then show how influential legal and
compliance personnel are in creating an evidentiary path that
can establish board liability, analyzing recent developments in
Delaware and federal securities law. We argue that the small
but growing number of cases imposing personal liability on underperforming compliance officers constitutes a backstop to undue pressures. Our case studies illustrate the application of this
framework.

45. See, e.g., E. Scott Reckard, Wells Fargo Fires Workers Accused of Cheating on Sales Goals, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/
oct/03/business/la-fi-mo-wells-fargo-workers-fired-20131003 (discussing Wells
Fargo’s issues with sales pressures even before the larger fake accounts scandal
broke).
46. See INDEP. DIRS. OF THE BD. OF WELLS FARGO & CO., SALES PRACTICES
INVESTIGATION REPORT 11–18 (2017) [hereinafter WELLS FARGO INDEPENDENT
DIRECTORS REPORT], https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/
investor-relations/presentations/2017/board-report.pdf (summarizing the findings of the report and discussing senior officers’ and corporate compliance organizations’ roles in allowing misconduct to continue); see also infra Part V.D.
47. See, e.g., In re Wells Fargo & Co. S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 16-CV05541-JST, 2017 WL 4414304, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2017); Consolidated
Amended Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co. S’holder Derivative Litig.,
(N.D.Cal. Feb. 24, 2017), 2017 WL 1044785; WELLS FARGO INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS REPORT, supra note 46, at i.
48. See Flitter et al., supra note 1.
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I. THE COMPLIANCE EXPLOSION REACHES THE
BOARDROOM
In the last ten years, the explosive growth of compliance departments has redefined the corporate landscape, demanding extraordinary resources and upending established corporate governance hierarchies. Most companies today have heavily
populated compliance teams with specialized staff.49 In fact, the
costs of compliance have become so enormous that companies increasingly use “big data” technologies to monitor their records
more effectively.50 In turn, the corporate executives in charge of
these small compliance armies have claimed greater attention
from the board, rising to top management ranks.51 Some companies assign the role of leading the compliance function to the general counsel, while others have established dedicated chief compliance officers.52 Regardless of designation, these officers
regularly update the board on the company’s exposure to legal
risk.53 Discussions on such topics as corruption, compliance and
ethics, and regulatory changes are now commonplace, often built
into strategic conversations about international expansion, talent development, and new product or service offerings.54 Perhaps
the best indication of the general counsels’ increased influence is
their continuously rising pay, which now exceeds $2 million on

49. See, e.g., Treanor, supra note 11 (noting JP Morgan Chase’s addition of
3000 compliance staff members).
50. See, e.g., How Big Data Analytics Is Transforming Regulatory Compliance, CREDIT SUISSE (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.credit-suisse.com/corporate/
en/articles/news-and-expertise/how-big-data-analytics-is-transforming
-regulatory-compliance-201711.html (discussing how increasing Big Data usage
led to a “45-fold increase in the number of productive alerts”).
51. See Langevoort, supra note 16, at 942 (noting that ethics and culture
are now “an explicit compliance goal” and that companies increasingly have a
Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer in order to meet this goal).
52. While there is debate among scholars as to whether the compliance
function ought to be entirely separate from the general counsel, both sides agree
that both positions should maintain direct access to the board, which is the foundation for our argument. See generally Bird & Park, supra note 13, at 204–05
(discussing the potential roles for a Chief Legal Officer in the future). But see
BEN W. HEINEMAN, JR., THE INSIDE COUNSEL REVOLUTION: RESOLVING THE
PARTNER GUARDIAN TENSION 441–44 (2016) (envisioning a dual-hatted Chief
Legal Officer with oversight of both legal and ethical matters).
53. NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., 2016–2017 NACD PUBLIC COMPANY GOVERNANCE SURVEY 2 (2017), https://www.nacdonline.org/files/2016%E2%80%
932017%20NACD%20Public%20Company%20Governance%20Survey%
20Executive%20Summary.pdf.
54. See id. (discussing generally the topics that are most frequently addressed by boards).
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average for S&P 500 companies and grows larger depending on
the overall size of the compliance team.55
This Part situates our argument in the scholarly and policy
literature by charting out the growth of compliance and the
scholarly accounts regarding its impact. Existing work highlights that companies developed their compliance operations
partly to better respond to towering criminal and regulatory
sanctions, and partly because they were mandated to do so by
federal law. We then explain why corporate law and business organization scholars view the ballooning of in-house legal and
compliance staff with skepticism.
A. CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES PUSH FOR
COMPLIANCE
Although employee monitoring has long been a key task for
corporate boards under state corporate law, the meteoric rise of
compliance in recent years has been largely the result of federal
intervention. Faced with a proliferation of new rules and regulations, both from Congress and from an ever-growing administrative state,56 federal authorities looked for strategies to further
incentivize private companies to toe the line.57 Their hope was
that, if better-supervised, corporate staff would be less inclined
to violate the law.58 Moreover, by instituting an internal corporate program dedicated to ensuring adherence to legal and regulatory requirements, the flow of information to regulators
would improve.59 Ultimately, the costs of compliance programs
are borne by shareholders rather than the public purse.60 Thus,
55. See EQUILAR, GENERAL COUNSEL PAY TRENDS 2016, at 8 (2016) (showing average total compensation of $2.1 million for GCs at S&P 500 companies
in 2016).
56. See, e.g., Grudges and Kludges: Too Much Federal Regulation Has Piled
Up in America, ECONOMIST, Mar. 4, 2017, at 19 (“Between 1970 and 2008 the
number of prescriptive words like ‘shall’ or ‘must’ in the code of federal regulations grew from 403,000 to nearly 963,000.”).
57. See Rachel E. Barkow, The New Policing of Business Crime, 37 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 435, 438 (2014) (observing that the government increased sanctions
in an effort to have companies adopt more internal compliance measures).
58. See id. at 442–43 (2014) (“The goal of these requirements is to encourage companies to adopt programs that will help them do a better job policing,
deterring wrongdoing, and creating a corporate culture of ethical and lawful
behavior.”).
59. See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2114 (2016) (“The SEC’s interventions in corporate
governance have traditionally focused on measures to improve the accuracy of
financial reporting.”).
60. See id. at 2121–28 (discussing compliance and shareholders’ role in
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authorities put in place various incentives and requirements fostering the establishment of compliance programs.61
1. Fostering the Growth of Compliance
Federal criminal authorities, called on to police a burgeoning roster of corporate crimes,62 used their sanctioning power in
order to bargain for corporate governance reforms. As early as
1991, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines offered an up-to-ninetyfive-percent reduction in penalties for companies that had previously instituted effective compliance programs.63 But it was the
practice of deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreements
(DPA/NPAs) that transformed compliance departments from a
mitigating factor to a key sanctioning mechanism for corporations. These agreements, which represent a settlement between
the Department of Justice (DOJ) and targeted companies, have
become the primary tool for criminal enforcement against corporations, utilized in over sixty-three percent of cases against corporations in recent years.64 Alongside fines or other sanctions,
DPA/NPAs often require an undertaking to dramatically expand
and reform the company’s compliance operation.65 Following a
DPA/NPA, companies often hire hundreds of new employees to
broaden the scope of their compliance efforts,66 so as to avoid repeating the same violations in the future. Undoubtedly, eliciting
management and observing that “compan[ies] pay[ ] for the compliance program[s]”).
61. See Paul Fiorelli, Will U.S. Sentencing Commission Amendments Encourage a New Ethical Culture Within Organizations?, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
565, 586 (2004) (“The original organizational guidelines prompted companies to
develop compliance and ethics programs.”).
62. See Barkow, supra note 57, at 445 (“Despite increasing sanctions and
the spread of corporate compliance programs . . . business crime remains a
pressing problem.”).
63. See Fiorelli, supra note 61, at 567 (finding that organizations with effective compliance programs can receive up to a ninety-five percent fine reduction).
64. BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS 72 (2014).
65. See id.; see also Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the New Regulators: Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 159, 160 (2008).
66. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 10, United States v. W.
Union Co., No. 1:17-cr-00011-CCC (M.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.justice
.gov/opa/press-release/file/938371/download (mandating an improved compliance program); see also Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 6, United States v.
Deutsche Bank AG, No. 3:15-cr-00061-RNC (D. Conn. Apr. 23, 2015), https://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/05/22/2014-04
-23-deutsche-bank-deferred-prosecution-agreement.pdf (noting that Deutsche
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the promise to hire an army of compliance officers alongside a
hefty fine helps criminal authorities grab headlines and boost
their standing in the business community and the nation more
generally.
Legal academics were skeptical towards compliance from
the very start. Criminal law scholars were puzzled by the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines’ choice to offer reduced fines if a company
established a compliance department.67 It seemed like a company could get off lightly simply by committing future resources,
with little assurance that crime prevention would be more effective down the line.68 In fact, the emphasis on monitoring and
procedures, hallmarks of effective compliance programs, was
widely dismissed as simple “box checking.”69 Thinkers in the socio-legal tradition have questioned whether compliance staff, instead of identifying and highlighting corporate failures, suppress
them due to peer pressure.70 Legal writers have puzzled over the
professional responsibilities of compliance officers who are also
Bank has significantly expanded its compliance operations); Western Union Financial Services, Inc. Resolves Previously Disclosed Investigation by New York
Department of Financial Services, W. UNION (Jan. 4, 2018), http://ir
.westernunion.com/news/archived-press-releases/press-release-details/2018/
Western-Union-Financial-Services-Inc-Resolves-Previously-Disclosed
-Investigation-by-New-York-Department-of-Financial-Services/default.aspx
(“Over the past six years, Western Union increased overall compliance funding
by more than 200 percent, and now spends approximately $200 million per year
on compliance, with more than 20 percent of its workforce currently dedicated
to compliance functions.”).
67. See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93
VA. L. REV. 853 (2007) (finding a lack of uniformity in compliance requirements
and little evidence that prosecutors keep track of these reforms after they impose them); see also Fiorelli, supra note 61, at 567 (observing that, if a company
does not establish a compliance department, it is “subject to a 400% fine multiplier”).
68. See Paul Fiorelli & Ann Marie Tracey, Why Comply? Organizational
Guidelines Offer a Safer Harbor in the Storm, 32 J. CORP. L. 467, 471, 489 (2008)
(discussing how revised guidelines increased the importance of compliance programs and elevated them from being simple “check the box” programs).
69. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 496 (2003) (observing that effective
compliance systems “contain monitoring and auditing systems”); see, e.g., Jayne
W. Barnard, Corporate Therapeutics at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 793, 816–17 (2008) (noting that initial drafts of
sanctions often include monitoring provisions but that monitoring is often cut
in subsequent drafts).
70. See, e.g., William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the
Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1413 (1999) (“Given the role of
top management in charting the course of legal and ethical compliance in corporations, it is difficult to underestimate the importance of subtle pressures to
walk the fine line between law abidance and law deviation.”).
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in-house lawyers, thus bound by their duties to the corporate client.71
Neither of these schools of thought is particularly optimistic
about compliance’s ability to prevent violations and ensure adherence to the law.72 Rather, they betray a deep skepticism as to
whether compliance would win corporate leaders’ support, or
whether it would remain sidelined from core corporate governance institutions.73 The concern was that, as the newly-arrived
hordes of compliance officers combed through the records of lowlevel employees, their investigations and findings might not
travel up the corporate chain of command.74
2. Compliance Enters the Boardroom
In recent years, federal criminal authorities have turned
their attention towards pushing boards to open their doors to
heads of compliance. DPA/NPAs often require companies to create a channel of communication through which the head of compliance can directly approach independent members of the board
or senior executives.75 Moreover, the 2010 Amendments to the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines condition any leniency in penalties
on whether the person with operational responsibility for the
compliance function communicates directly with the board.76
The 2010 Amendments go further in suggesting that the head of
compliance provide an annual report to the board regarding the
implementation and effectiveness of the compliance program,

71. See generally Coffee, supra note 13 (discussing the possible roles and
potential conflicts of interest for attorneys as the gatekeepers of compliance).
72. See Maurice E. Stucke, In Search of Effective Ethics & Compliance Programs, 39 J. CORP. L. 769, 775 (2014) (observing that the current system is not
working, but that there are no guarantees that a different system would work
either).
73. Id. (noting that “an intrinsic, ethics-based approach” has been deemphasized).
74. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267, 326 (2004) (“Reporting up the chain of command is a standard feature of internal controls and
compliance programs. It is also one of the most difficult for . . . employees to
meet.”).
75. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 11–12, United States v.
VimpelCom Ltd., No. 16-cr-00137 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.justice
.gov/criminal-fraud/file/828301/download (noting the company’s FCPA violations and its requirement that the company to assign compliance oversight and
responsibility to one or more senior corporate executives who would report directly to the Board of Directors, or any appropriate committee of the board).
76. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f ) (3)(C) (2018).
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and prompt updates in case of current or potential criminal violations.77 These reports help authorities assess whether the company’s compliance department had “adequate resources” and
“appropriate authority,” so as to accord it with the leniency allowed by the law. By brandishing sanction relief as a payoff for
reform, authorities sought to ensure that compliance heads
would have no trouble garnering the board’s attention, thus elevating compliance as a corporate priority.
Companies responded by setting up the institutional links
required. Private consulting services sprang up to offer opinions,
resources, and trainings for boards on how to effectively communicate with their compliance officer.78 Professional associations, too, weighed in, offering specific advice regarding reporting structures, board committees, and the frequency of
communication between compliance and the board.79 As a result,
heads of compliance now have the ear of top management and
board members, a prerogative they can utilize to raise awareness
about illegal conduct to the board. In practice, a number of surveys are revealing that compliance officers are now communicating with the board more frequently than ever before.80 These
enforcement guidelines, combined with the statutory initiatives
outlined below, have gained in-house legal experts a position at
the core of the action in modern corporations.
B. NEW STATUTES INSTITUTIONALIZE COMPLIANCE
Institutionalizing compliance as an internal corporate monitoring mechanism appealed not only to criminal enforcement
authorities, but also to Congress and other federal regulators.
For example, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act requires truthful
financial reporting practices, which would track potential
bribes;81 this is now interpreted by the Securities and Exchange

77. Id. at cmt. 11.
78. See SOC’Y OF CORP. COMPLIANCE & ETHICS, COMPLIANCE TRAINING
AND THE BOARD 2 (2017) (stating that board training is prevalent).
79. See, e.g., About Us, NAT’L SOC’Y COMPLIANCE PROFESSIONALS, https://
nscp.org/about-us (highlighting “continuing education to further [compliance
professionals’] knowledge and specialized skills, and regulatory involvement
through representation of compliance interests”).
80. See Tanina Rostain, General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Preliminary Findings and New Research Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 473
(2008) (“The large majority of respondents reported directly to the Chief Executive Officer or Chair of the Board.”).
81. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 § 103(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd–1(a).
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Commission (SEC) as essentially mandating a thorough compliance effort.82 At other times, Congress has instituted a specialized compliance process, such as the anti-money laundering suspicious activity reporting.83 Along these lines, a large number of
congressional statutes institutionalize compliance processes in a
range of fields such as environmental standards, healthcare, bioethics, privacy, and intellectual property.84 Our goal here is not
to provide an exhaustive list, but to underline the importance of
compliance as a policymaking tool.
There are two legislative efforts that garnered national attention not only because of their subject matter and ambition,
but also because they had compliance at their core: the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act,85 and the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act.86 In both
cases, a series of high-profile corporate scandals rocked confidence in national markets, and Congress responded not only
through new substantive rules, but also by demanding internal
reforms from corporations.
Sarbanes-Oxley essentially ushered in a federal requirement to bolster accounting compliance in public companies,
which boards often implemented by hiring more compliance professionals. Coming on the heels of massive accounting fraud at
Enron, WorldCom, and other companies,87 the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act mandated that all public companies build effective internal
control departments, which would monitor front-line employees
82. The books and records provision of the FCPA is implemented by SEC
Rule 13b2-1. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1 (2018) (“No person shall directly or indirectly, falsify or cause to be falsified, any book, record or account subject to
section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act.”).
83. See Stavros Gadinis & Colby Mangels, Collaborative Gatekeepers, 73
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 797, 870 (2016) (discussing the Annunzio-Wylie Act and
noting that it “did not define what constitutes suspicious activity, nor did it
elaborate on the steps that U.S. financial institutions must take in order to comply with this obligation”).
84. See generally Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law’s Heartland and
Frontiers, 32 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 511 (2015) (highlighting environmental statutes related to compliance); Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247 (2011) (discussing
privacy regulation and compliance).
85. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
86. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 204, 124 Stat. 1376, 1454 (2010) (“It is the purpose of this title to
provide the necessary authority to liquidate failing financial companies that
pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the United States.”).
87. See Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 127, 128 (2003).
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and ensure that accounting was based on correct information.88
To further ascertain the effectiveness of internal monitoring,
Sarbanes-Oxley enlisted the help of external auditors, who,
along with the company’s CEO and CFO, were required to review
internal controls and attest to their adequacy.89 Besides accountants, the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms also touched upon other gatekeepers, such as securities attorneys, as we discuss below.90 Fifteen years after their passage, whether the Sarbanes-Oxley
reforms have managed to stem accounting misstatements is very
much in doubt.91 But these reforms certainly puffed up compliance departments, which found themselves with a broader scope
of work and additional firepower.
As the 2007 financial crisis fueled further mistrust in companies’ management, Congress responded by adopting the 2010
Dodd-Frank Act. The sheer size and complexity of Dodd-Frank,
which introduced over 27,000 new restrictions by some counts,92
made compliance departments indispensable to companies that
hope to avoid breaking the law. But Dodd-Frank also included
some reforms specifically geared towards compliance. Importantly, it introduced a whistleblower regime, which allows
the SEC to offer to informants bounties that amount to ten to
thirty percent of overall sanctions, sometimes reaching tens of
millions of dollars.93 Although the SEC does not require whistleblowers to address their internal compliance chiefs before alerting the agency, many of them do, and thus companies have developed compliance policies so as to better handle whistleblower
complaints. Moreover, Dodd-Frank required certain private financial firms that are not tightly regulated, such as those sub-

88. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 301–02.
89. See Catherine Shakespeare, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Five Years On:
What Have We Learned?, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 333, 335 (2008) (“Section 404
requires an annual audit of management’s assessment of the effectiveness of
the internal control.”).
90. See infra text accompanying notes 237–41.
91. See John C. Coates IV, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 91, 96 (2007).
92. See Patrick McLaughlin & Oliver Sherouse, The Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act May Be the Biggest Law Ever, MERCATUS CTR. GEO. MASON U. (July 20, 2015), https://www.mercatus.org/
publication/dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act-may
-be-biggest-law-ever.
93. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 922(b)–(c), 929A (2010) (amending 18 U.S.C.
§ 1514A).
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ject to the 1940 Investment Advisers Act, to develop a compliance department and designate a chief compliance officer.94
Overall, the role of compliance chiefs became even more prominent after Dodd-Frank.
The successive reforms of Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank
broadened the scope of compliance operations and introduced
new institutional links between in-house monitors and traditional corporate organs, such as the board and its committees.
These congressional efforts aligned with the DOJ’s corporate enforcement strategy to strengthen the position of compliance
heads and other in-house legal experts within the corporate hierarchy. Yet, whether in-house legal experts would fulfill policymakers’ expectations, and in what fashion, remained highly debated. As we outline below, corporate law scholars are generally
very skeptical about whether legal and compliance experts can
effectively supervise their employers.
C. CORPORATE LAW SCHOLARS DISTRUST COMPLIANCE
As a government-motivated reform, compliance poses particular challenges for a body of law that prioritizes individuals’
freedom of contract, such as corporate law.95 Particularly after
the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, corporate law thinkers sought to
understand how compliance fits within the constellation of actors that constitute or revolve around the modern corporation.96
Business law had long enlisted the help of private actors
outside the corporation, such as accountants, bankers, and attorneys, to monitor it in key moments, such as securities offerings. These professionals, termed “gatekeepers,”97 assure investors that a company’s disclosures are accurate by putting their
reputation on the line. On top of these reputational incentives,
the law imposes liability on gatekeepers who fail to perform their
due diligence duties and let corporate fraud go undetected. As
monitoring is also one of compliance’s central goals, legal and
compliance officers were swiftly categorized by legal academia
94. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(6) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7 (2018).
95. See Griffith, supra note 59, at 2130 (arguing that “corporate governance
is inconsistent with current theories of the firm” which are based on contract).
96. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005) (“The Sarbanes-Oxley
(SOX) Act . . . is not just a considerable change in law, but also a departure in
the mode of regulation.”).
97. See Reiner H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 54 (1986) (explaining the concept
of gatekeepers).
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as another type of gatekeeper. Indeed, these in-house monitors
share many of the characteristics of the outside gatekeepers.
They are both part of a professional class with expertise that
provides them with the skillset necessary to perform their monitoring task. Importantly, it is the failure in monitoring others’
misconduct, rather than their own misconduct, which puts outside gatekeepers and internal legal and compliance experts in
trouble.
As corporate lawyers set out to analyze compliance through
the lens of gatekeeper theory, their predictions were, unsurprisingly, quite dire. As gatekeepers, in-house legal and compliance
officers are quite weak. Unlike most other professionals, who
have a roster of clients, in-house experts work exclusively for a
single company, and are thus more likely to succumb to pressure
from management.98 Moreover, their long association with a single company may blunt their instincts and normalize illegality.99
This behavioral bias might be particularly potent for lawyers,
who are likely to prioritize loyalty to clients rather than gatekeeping.100 Faced with these pressures, in-house compliance experts might choose to hole themselves in their offices and avoid
evidence of wrongdoing.101 Although these pressures are common for other gatekeepers, they are counterbalanced by the
threat of liability if gatekeeper approval is provided without
proper due diligence. But laws rarely require in-house legal and
compliance experts to provide their approval for a transaction.102
Without the threat of liability for failing to adequately monitor,
98. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR.,
PORATE GOVERNANCE 146 (2006).

GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND COR-

99. See Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 968 (2005) (“[T]o the extent general counsel participates
at an early stage in shaping major transactions and corporate policy, counsel’s
ability to bring detached, professional judgment to bear in assessing their legality may be compromised, especially when the question of legality is tinged in
shades of gray as opposed to black and white.”); see also Kim, supra note 14, at
1037 (“Inside counsel are subject to situational pressures . . . that induce them
to acquiesce in managerial fraud.”).
100. See William H. Simon, Whom (Or What) Does the Organization’s Lawyer
Represent?: An Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 57, 89 (2003);
see also Langevoort, supra note 16, at 957–58 (“[L]awyer self-interest and client
self-interest are more likely to converge in cognition and corporate culture, so
that in-house lawyers, especially, are not particularly reliable enthusiasts for
the socially optimal compliance point.”).
101. See Kim, supra note 14, at 1026 (“Even in the face of unethical conduct,
conformity pressures . . . can lead inside lawyers to remain silent and not risk
the consequences of whistle-blowing.”).
102. See infra Part IV.
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these in-house officers have less of an incentive to do an objectively diligent job and little to fall back on when pressured to
turn a blind eye.
For all its analytical consistency, the gatekeeper-based portrayal of compliance is, we argue, theoretically misdirected and
incomplete. It expects in-house lawyers to act as enforcers, which
is not in line with either the powers entrusted to them by law or
with any realistic expectations of what they can achieve. Moreover, the gatekeeper model leaves out the most important contribution of in-house legal experts. While in-house legal experts
may not be able to prevent corporate leaders from behaving illegally, they can make it easier to hold corporate leaders responsible when wrongdoing occurs. This power places them at the center of corporate action, we argue in Part II below, rather than at
the periphery, as current literature seems to suggest.
II. DELAWARE’S STRICTNESS PROPELS IN-HOUSE
LEGAL EXPERTS TO THE FOREFRONT
Even though legal and compliance experts operate largely
in the absence of strict statutory mandates and regulatory requirements, as discussed above, they are far from powerless. The
advent of compliance programs, alongside state and federal rulings emphasizing the board’s supervisory duties, have provided
legal and compliance experts with a direct reporting avenue to
the board. They submit to the board information about employees’ compliance with the law, identifying potential issues as they
arise from their monitoring and their other interactions. On
their own, these reports do not have any direct legal consequences. The board is free to choose how much attention to pay,
whether to investigate further, or whether to table the matter.
From a legal status standpoint, these reports do not amount to
anything more than an informal private document.
Yet, we argue, if the issue highlighted in a report becomes
the center of an enforcement action by regulators or a class action by private parties, the importance of the report changes dramatically. As we discuss below, under both current fiduciary
duty law and federal securities regulation, plaintiffs would ideally want a paper trail connecting the violation they have spotted
with the board. This paper trail can be readily found in the legal
and compliance experts’ reports. Coming at the heels of an extensive investigation by a dedicated compliance department, internal reports can describe in extensive detail the underlying
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misconduct. Their primary drafters are either lawyers themselves or assisted by others with legal training, and they are thus
likely to cover all the aspects necessary to ensure a violation is
established, as prescribed by law. By offering the evidence connecting the company with victims’ claims or exposing directors
to liability towards shareholders, these reports can radically alter the legal landscape for the board and its executive officers.
Pulling together all the elements discussed above reveals
how explosive such a report can prove for the company’s board.
Before receiving this report, the board could validly claim that it
had no direct knowledge of the circumstances giving rise to underlying violations by its employees, and was largely unsuspicious of the extent of the problem. That assertion may portray
the board as negligent, but it also relieves its members of any
liability, since negligence still falls within the contours of good
faith. Once a damning internal legal report lands before the
board, however, it shatters the safe haven of negligence and
forces the board to confront reality. The more detailed the description, the more plentiful the examples, the more thorough
the investigation, the less room the report allows the board to
wiggle out of awareness, forcing directors to face the prospect of
personal liability.
The transformative impact of well-informed legal reports is
very much due to a much-bemoaned turn in Delaware case law
in the landmark 2006 Stone v. Ritter ruling.103 In Stone, the Delaware Supreme Court declared unambiguously that only bad
faith could render directors and officers liable for failing to monitor illegal activity.104 Much of the corporate law literature lamented such a high standard, as we discuss below,105 viewing it
as practically impossible to clear. Yet, our assessment of over ten
years of Delaware jurisprudence shows otherwise. The explosive
growth of internal legal and compliance departments is filling
the gap, allowing legal and compliance experts to accumulate the
necessary information and communicate it to the board. In doing
so, we argue, they drastically alter directors’ and officers’ liability calculus. Below, we analyze Delaware’s compliance doctrine,
showing how in-house legal experts are instrumental in guiding
the board’s state of mind in every step.

103. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del.
2006).
104. Id. at 370.
105. See infra Part II.B.
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A. BAD FAITH AS A FOUNDATION OF DELAWARE’S COMPLIANCE
DOCTRINE
Delaware courts’ first major step into the realm of compliance came with In re Caremark, now a mainstay of Delaware
jurisprudence. Caremark targeted what Chancellor Allen, who
wrote the case’s decision, termed “an unconsidered failure of the
board to act,” rather than a harmful or unprofitable management action.106 Shareholders complained that the board had
failed to spot and prevent illegal activity that, having unfolded
for years, landed the company in million-dollar fines.107 Generally, the law does not prohibit inactivity, unless circumstances
exist that should prod defendants to action.108 Thus, to determine whether failure to act was actionable, Allen had to determine the conditions under which the board had an obligation to
monitor employees in the first place.109
For Allen, the stakes could not have been higher. Since its
1963 ruling in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., the
Delaware Supreme Court had declared that boards ought to react when they face red flags suggesting illegality.110 But in companies with thousands of employees like Caremark, operating in
highly regulated industries such as health care, boards would
only rarely come across such red flags in their regular course of
business. Thus, it was clear to Allen that boards could not, in
good faith, stand back and wait for illegality to become known;
rather, their duty should be to seek out these illegalities through
active monitoring.111 And yet, no board could ever hope to catch
all the illegal conduct of its subordinates, no matter how hard it
tried. If drawn too broadly, boards’ duty to monitor could engulf
all boards in liability, as any employee misconduct is likely to
look preventable in hindsight.
106. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del.
1996).
107. See id. at 964.
108. See id. at 971 (holding that directors could only be held liable for failure
to act if they “should have known that violations of the law were occurring
and . . . took no steps in a good faith effort to prevent or remedy that situation”).
109. See id.
110. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963)
(holding that if a corporate director “has ignored either willfully or through inattention obvious danger signs of employee wrongdoing, the law will cast the
burden of liability upon him”).
111. See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 (“[I]t is important that the board exercise a good faith judgment that appropriate information will come to its attention in a timely manner as a matter of ordinary operations.”).
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To balance these opposing considerations, Caremark set the
foundations of a two-pronged claim, now known as a Caremark
claim, that defines Delaware jurisprudence in this area.112 The
first prong directs boards to set up a compliance system. Caremark does not specify the components of this system, leaving this
choice to the board.113 However, the compliance system must be
adequate “in concept and design” so that the board can expect,
in good faith, to receive accurate and timely information about
employee misconduct.114
The second prong of a Caremark claim turns its focus on
whether the board, after setting up the compliance system, fully
discharges the obligations that derive from that system.115 The
Delaware Supreme Court, which espoused and developed the
Caremark test in Stone, emphasized that the Board in that case
actually heard presentations from compliance heads and monitored the operation of the compliance department closely
through its Audit Committee.116 If the board is shown to have
received information pointing to illegal actions by company employees, then Delaware law evaluates the board’s reaction, scrutinizing its good or bad faith in doing so.117
The realm of activity that fell outside Caremark’s twopronged test, and relieved the board from any liability, was as
important as the scope of misconduct it captured.118 Crucially,
the gap between Caremark’s two prongs is considerable.119 It is
highly likely that a board could set up a state-of-the-art compliance system, which nevertheless fails to capture employee misconduct that turns out to be highly detrimental for the company.
After all, if every instance of employee misconduct resulted in
liability for the board, the law would equate “bad outcome[s]
with bad faith.”120 As Stone clarified, Delaware courts will impose liability only if they are convinced that the board acted in
bad faith, i.e. that it either evidently knew, or it can be reasonably inferred that it was aware, of underlying violations of law.121
112. See id. at 967–70; see also Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364 (Del. 2006).
113. See Caremark, 698 A.2d 95 at 970.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 967–71.
116. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 372.
117. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
118. Id. at 967–71.
119. Id. at 971.
120. Stone, 911 A.2d at 373.
121. Id. at 370.
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Mindful of the risk that any violations undetected by the company’s compliance system could be used as evidence of its inadequacy with hindsight, Chancellor Allen declared that only a “sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—
such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information system exists—will establish the lack of good faith that
is a necessary condition to liability.”122 Bad faith is the necessary
element that plaintiffs need to prove in order to establish that
the board has been disloyal to shareholders.123
B. CORPORATE LAW SCHOLARS DEBATE BAD FAITH
Once Stone elevated bad faith to the key ingredient of a
Caremark claim, many corporate law scholars reacted with exasperation. The general expectation was that the bad faith requirement would render a Caremark claim even harder to establish than previously thought.124 For some, the inquiry into the
subjective motives of the board, which investigating bad faith invites, detracts from the goal of setting up an objectively adequate
compliance system.125 By delegating the setup of its compliance
operation to reputable outside experts, a board could easily establish a good faith belief in the adequacy of its system, satisfying the first prong of a Caremark claim. When misconduct arises,
despite the otherwise adequate compliance system, plaintiffs
bear the considerable burden of showing that the board acted in
bad faith, knowingly disregarding red flags. Putting their finger
on such evidence, critics feared, would often prove exceedingly
hard for plaintiffs. After all, Chancellor Allen himself intended
a Caremark claim to be “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”126
For these reasons, Stone seemed to further fuel preexisting
concerns that compliance could act as a shield—or even just a
smokescreen—behind which the board can readily hide to evade
its duties.127 Some lost faith in Caremark’s ability to discipline
122. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
123. Id.
124. See Arlen, supra note 20, at 343.
125. See Griffith, supra note 59, at 2111 (“Corporate law looks to the motives
of the board in implementing the system rather than the efficacy of the system
itself.”).
126. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967.
127. See Krawiec, supra note 69, at 491 (arguing that “internal compliance
structures do not deter prohibited conduct within firms, and may largely serve
a window-dressing function that provides both market legitimacy and reduced
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boards, and stoically placed their hopes on federal laws and
agency regulations, which could quickly outpace Caremark by
imposing stricter standards.128 Others called for adjusting Caremark liability to include shaming sanctions, arguing that corporate actors care about their reputation as much as they care
about board liability.129 When the 2007 financial crisis revealed
that internal compliance leaves many risks unchecked, particularly non-legal ones,130 there was widespread fear that the doctrine was failing its promises.
Against this opprobrium of criticism, defendants of Stone
fought back by arguing that imposing liability on a good faith
independent director would torpedo the foundations of modern
corporate law.131 In this account, good faith encapsulates the
business judgment rule, which allows boards to take entrepreneurial risks without constant fear of liability. The discretion
that Caremark allows directors in establishing a compliance system should be celebrated, rather than maligned, because it preserves board autonomy.132 At least, critics’ tepid reaction to
Stone might seem premature, especially since federal securities
doctrine was also exploring concepts related to bad faith and succeeding in striking a good balance.133
Even though Stone’s critics and proponents fiercely disagree
on the amount of effort and resources boards should devote to
monitoring, they both view Stone’s bad faith requirement as
largely protective of boards. Our task below is to explore the extent of this protection, analyzing over ten years of jurisprudence
in light of the bad faith requirement. The results of our study
hold surprises for both camps above. We show that, even though
legal liability”); Stucke, supra note 72, at 832 (noting that “too many ethics programs remain ineffective and corporate crime persists”).
128. See Mercer Bullard, Caremark’s Irrelevance, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 15,
50 (2013).
129. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1811, 1850 (2001).
130. See John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 67 (2014); Christina Parajon Skinner,
Misconduct Risk, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1559, 1564 (2016).
131. See Strine et al., supra note 21; see also Claire A. Hill & Brett H.
McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1769, 1770 (2007).
132. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power:
Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619,
1675–76 (2001).
133. See Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 719, 738–39 (2007).
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bad faith is indeed very hard to prove, it is not as impossible to
establish as critics might have feared. Rather, compliance officials and legal counsel can, and often do, ring the alarm that precludes the board from remaining inactive.
C. LEGAL AND COMPLIANCE OFFICERS AS ARBITERS OF BAD
FAITH
The ability of legal and compliance officers to determine
whether the board remains in good faith or enters into bad faith
comes, perversely, from the careful efforts of Delaware courts to
prescribe director liability for violations of law by subordinates.
In the decade since Stone was decided, a large set of judicial opinions have been continuously trying to delineate the circumstances where directors behaved in bad faith, and distinguish
them from situations where the board showed appropriate loyalty and care but calamity nevertheless ensued. To follow Stone’s
focus on bad faith, courts sought concrete, specific evidence, capable of drawing a direct link between what happened on the
ground and what the board knew about it.134 In case after case,
courts were able to find this direct link when they were faced
with an internal report, typically by a legal expert or compliance
officer, informing the board about the underlying problem, as we
show below.135
Below, we trace the doctrinal edifice that Delaware jurisprudence has built on the Caremark foundations, and outline the
inflection points developed for each prong. Figure 1 provides visual guidance. We show that, in every step along the way, courts
turn to in-house legal experts and their work in order to determine boards’ good or bad faith.

134. See, e.g., Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 507 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“[T]he
complaint does not plead a single fact suggesting specific red—or even yellow—
flags were waved at the outside directors.”).
135. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Pyott, 765 F.3d 1137, 1151–57 (9th Cir. 2014);
Westmoreland Cty. Emp. Ret. Sys. v. Parkinson, 727 F.3d 719, 726–30 (7th Cir.
2013); In re Pfizer Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 722 F. Supp. 2d 453, 460
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); Horman v. Abney, No. 12290-VCS, 2017 WL 242571, at *8 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 19, 2017); In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative & Class Action Litig.,
No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *7–13 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011).
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Figure 1. Steps in the Caremark Framework

D. HAS THE BOARD ESTABLISHED AN ADEQUATE COMPLIANCE
SYSTEM?
It is not often that courts find a company that has utterly
and systematically failed to set up a compliance system, as
Chancellor Allen directed them to determine.136 But when they
do, courts typically underline the role of lawyers and compliance
officers in allowing these failures to continue.
1. Is There an Adequate Compliance System?
Although Caremark itself does not provide a definition of an
adequate compliance system, courts have looked at current practice to reach this assessment. Features such as an Audit Committee that meets frequently, a well-populated compliance department, regular reviews, and board level discussions will help
courts conclude that the compliance system is adequate. In
Guttman v. Huang, Vice-Chancellor Strine underlined the importance of presenting the court with such data about the operation of the compliance system.137 He also made clear that, since
the burden of proving compliance inadequacy falls on plaintiffs,
136. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del.
Ch. 1996).
137. Guttman, 823 A.2d at 507–08.
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they are much more likely to convince the court if they first submit an official request for the books and records of the company,
which can provide them with the relevant information.138 This
inquiry tends to emphasize processes, rather than outcomes, as
critics are quick to point out. But processes such as these are
often at the hands of lawyers, who may find themselves in charge
of designing and running the system. For that reason, they may
end up targeted by the court.
Only extreme defects will lead courts to find a virtual lack
of a compliance system. One such example involves a company
that had made no actual effort nor taken any steps to establish
a financial reporting system, despite Sarbanes-Oxley’s clear pronouncements.139 Eventually, fraudulent accounting, underpaying taxes, and double-borrowing on receivables drove the company to bankruptcy. The court did not hesitate to fault the
company’s top lawyer, even though he was not a board member,
for failing to establish any reporting system that would track
those failures and refer them to the SEC.140 Another case, Rich
ex rel. Fuqi International v. Yu Kwai Chong, involves a jewelry
company that went bankrupt less than a year after its IPO.141
The board had taken some steps towards creating a compliance
department, e.g., by creating an Audit Committee.142 But there
was so little monitoring on the ground that the company failed
to accurately record purchases, payments, and even its diamond
inventory.143 The court found that the existing compliance system was not meaningful.144
2. Is the Board Aware of Failures in Its Compliance System?
Rather than on the virtual absence of a compliance apparatus, such as discussed above, Caremark claims often focus on
a sizeable gap in an otherwise extensive and well-resourced compliance system. This gap will have come to light after a huge
public scandal, perhaps one involving numerous tort victims, violations of regulatory requirements, and sometimes criminal
138. Id. at 504.
139. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012).
140. See Miller v. McDonald (In re World Health Alts., Inc.), 385 B.R. 576,
592–95 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) (explaining that the test promulgated by Caremark is applicable to officers of a company, not just directors, and applying the
test to the in-house general counsel).
141. 66 A.3d 963, 967–71 (Del. Ch. 2013).
142. Id. at 982.
143. Id. at 983.
144. Id.
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charges. However, the existence of regular compliance processes
does not allow the court to conclude that the board has utterly
failed in its monitoring mission. Yet, the gap in the compliance
system is not without consequences. Plaintiffs can still claim
that the board was aware of the problem, but failed to take any
action to remedy it. This failure of oversight is rooted in bad
faith, and is one in which lawyers can play a major part.
This type of claim was at the heart of GM’s ignition switch
scandal.145 Due to a design defect, the switch malfunctioned and
turned off the car engine at critical moments, also preventing the
airbags from launching.146 Although GM employees received numerous reports and lawsuits about the problem, the board remained unaware of the specifics until long after it should
have.147 Plaintiffs had little trouble convincing the court that
there was a gap in GM’s compliance process, at least in hindsight, aided in large part by the independent investigation ordered by GM’s new management.148 More specifically, there were
multiple board committees with vague and potentially overlapping risk oversight mandates, which blunted board members’ focus.149 The technical department charged with collecting data
and submitting reports required by the National Highway Traffic Safety Agency (NHTSA) was slow and underperforming.150
Although NHTSA had complained to the head of that department, and some officers knew about these complaints, they were
never discussed with the board.151 Finally, the legal department
had received many lawsuits involving ignition switch failures,
but had managed to settle these at or below a $5 million cutoff,
and thus avoided involving the General Counsel, who could have
informed the board if he had known.152 Together, vagueness in
board committee mandates, subpar data collection and reporting
by the technical team, and misplaced cutoffs for the legal team,
combined with a lack of initiative by subordinates, resulted in a
gap in the GM compliance system, as the court accepted.153

145. In re Gen. Motors Co. Derivative Litig., No. 9627-VCG, 2015 WL
3958724, at *11 (Del. Ch. June 26, 2015), aff ’ d, 133 A.3d 971 (Del. 2016).
146. Id. at *2.
147. Id.
148. See id. at *4–9.
149. See id.
150. Id. at *8.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at *17.
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But, besides identifying a gap in the company’s compliance
processes, plaintiffs must also convince the court that this gap
reflects bad faith on the board’s behalf.154 To establish bad faith,
plaintiffs must show that the board was aware that its compliance process was not operating properly, and failed to take any
remedial action regardless.155 For example, a compliance report
alerting the board of the looming gap would help to establish its
bad faith. In GM’s case, the plaintiffs were only able to point to
reports that identified broad safety risks that called for greater
attention.156 Although these reports referred generally to quality
control, none mentioned anything specific about the ignition
switch problem.157 The court saw these reports as lacking in
specificity, and found that the board’s decision to take risk mitigation measures by delegating oversight to top management sufficiently responsive.158
In their search for bad faith, courts often look for motives.
For example, an impending acquisition might help explain why
the board was likely to disregard indications of overstated earnings.159 Considerable profits from illegal activity might help explain why the board was keen to disregard red flags.160 Both
Chancellor Glasscock and Justice Vaughn suggested at the Supreme Court hearing of the appeal against GM that they would
have been more likely to find bad faith if plaintiffs were able to
point to a specific motive behind the compliance failure.161 Yet,
plaintiffs at GM were only able to point to idleness and a stultified, bureaucratic culture within the company as the core roots
of the problem.162 The court swiftly categorized these as indications of negligence, in all likelihood, but certainly not bad
faith.163
The plaintiffs, lacking outright evidence of bad faith, sought
an alternative ground for their claims in recklessness.164 To
154. See id. (“Pleadings . . . indicating that directors did a poor job of overseeing risk in a poorly managed corporation do not imply director bad faith.”).
155. Id. at *11–12.
156. See id. at *17.
157. Id. at *14.
158. Id. at *16–17.
159. See Miller v. McDonald (In re World Health Alts., Inc.), 385 B.R. 576,
584–85 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008).
160. See Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 507–08 (Del. Ch. 2003).
161. In re Gen. Motors Co. Derivative Litig., 2015 WL 3958724 at *16.
162. Id. at *15.
163. Id. at *17.
164. Id. at *11.
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show that the board was reckless in not monitoring a situation
more closely, plaintiffs drew the court’s attention to exogenous
circumstances requiring more intense monitoring.165 For example, plaintiffs in In re Goldman Sachs argued that, by setting up
a highly competitive compensation structure, the board should
have expected that some employees would be tempted to bend
ethics rules.166 In other words, the mere change in the compensation structure should have heightened the board’s compliance
efforts.167 Ultimately, this argument relies not on actual red
flags, i.e., violations on the ground, but on the higher likelihood
of violations. As we will see below, arguments about the increased risk of legal problems, but without examples of such
problems already reaching the board, have failed to convince
courts that directors have not satisfied their duties.168
In contrast, when the board is found to have certain and indisputable warnings about problems in its compliance efforts,
and a clear motive to disregard these warnings, courts are more
willing to find bad faith. Such an indisputably clear warning to
the board about compliance failures often comes in the form of
regulatory action requiring the company to intensify its compliance efforts. In Westmoreland v. Parkinson, a pharmaceutical
company had agreed that one of its products, a medical pump,
could cause serious harm to patients and undertook to put in
place a compliance effort to recall and repair these devices.169 At
first, the board invested significant effort and resources into
compliance.170 But when the company came up with a brand new
pump, the board cut the budget of its compliance efforts in half,
and directed its attention toward promoting the new pump.171
Throughout this period, regulators continued sending warnings
to the board, thus putting directors on notice that violations were
ongoing.172 The board’s strategic choice to promote sales of the
new pump instead of repairing the old, faulty one provided the
court with the motive it required, to find that the board had

165. Id. at *16–17.
166. In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL
4826104, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011).
167. See id. at *19.
168. See infra Part II.E.1.
169. Westmoreland Cty. Emp. Ret. Sys. v. Parkinson, 727 F.3d 719, 722 (7th
Cir. 2013).
170. Id. at 722–23.
171. Id. at 726.
172. Id. at 727.
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acted in bad faith in reducing the intensity of its compliance efforts.173
E. HAS THE BOARD FULLY DISCHARGED ITS OBLIGATIONS
ARISING FROM ITS MONITORING SYSTEM?
After approving a compliance system in line with current
practices, boards can readily satisfy Caremark’s first prong.
However, compliance systems are not intended as a one-time
adoption of a rulebook, nor as a task fully delegated to others,
but as an ongoing framework for constant monitoring. The purpose of this compliance system is to keep the board informed,
generating “red flags” that alert the board when employees look
like they are misbehaving. Thus, when illegal activity surfaces,
unavoidably the focus turns on whether the board has fully performed its monitoring role. Plaintiffs, often bolstered by multimillion dollar settlements with victims, regulators, and criminal
authorities, will rush to claim that, if failures of such magnitude
escaped the board’s attention, it surely was a disloyal board.
These claims are unlikely to go very far in Delaware courts.
Time and again, Delaware judges have stated that a Caremark
claim must state with “particularized facts” the allegations of
failure on behalf of the board as well as its bad faith.174 To satisfy
this standard, plaintiffs must be able to connect the failure in
question with each specific member of the board. In practice,
plaintiffs need to show that the board was aware of indications
of illegality, that these indications amounted to “red flags” that
should set the board in motion, and that the board’s reaction to
these red flags was lacking. Courts often consider the three steps
above in one swoop, but the paragraphs below separate them for
analytical purposes.
Delaware’s insistence on particularized evidence of monitoring failure and bad faith had an unforeseen consequence. Circumstantial evidence, such as meetings or risk warnings, will be
heavily discounted by courts. In contrast, internal legal and compliance reports, which inform the board in writing about the results of a thorough examination, are among the few documents
that can easily exceed the evidentiary bar.

173. Id. at 728–30.
174. See infra notes 176–80 and accompanying text (collecting Delaware
cases that set the parameters of a Caremark claim).
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1. Have Red Flags Reached the Board?
When Delaware courts demand particularized evidence of
awareness, they require specific communications addressed to
each individual defendant that express the underlying red flags
in no uncertain terms. Preferably, these communications will be
addressed to the board as a whole. If addressed to one member,
or to one committee, then they provide evidence of awareness
only as far as the recipient or committee members are concerned,
but courts will require further evidence that the reported facts
were communicated to other directors.175
Identifying evidence of board awareness has become more
palatable in today’s digital world, where details of meetings and
presentations are readily available. Delaware courts have underlined that plaintiffs’ chances of convincing the court about a
Caremark claim are much higher after they examine the company’s books and records, typically granted only after a formal
request from the court.176 Thus, plaintiffs have poured over company documents to unearth instances showing that information
about violations had indeed reached the board.
In their efforts, plaintiffs repeatedly stumble across a key
limitation. Reports of employees’ violations, or strong indications
of misconduct, may reach the level of senior staff within the company hierarchy, but do not get elevated to the board or to top
management. In Desimone v. Barrows, an anonymous internal
report that outlined how senior employees orchestrated stock options backdating reached only one officer in the accounting department.177 Then-Vice Chancellor Strine not only rejected the
argument that the board had knowledge, but pointed to the
memo, which outlined employees’ efforts to get around the compliance system, as evidence that the board had no reason to suspect that something was amiss.178
Even direct and damning evidence of legal misconduct, such
as investigations by regulators into the company, must be clearly
shown to have reached the board. This requirement underlines
the crucial role of legal officers, who get to control the inflow of
175. See Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506–08 (Del. Ch. 2003) (explaining that the plaintiff failed to plead sufficient particularized factual allegations
that would suggest the company’s independent directors were aware of any red
flags).
176. Id. at 504 (noting the plaintiff ’ s failure “to use the books and records
device . . . to prepare a solid complaint”).
177. 924 A.2d 908, 940 (Del. Ch. 2007).
178. Id. at 939–40.
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information to the board. In Horman v. Abney, plaintiffs pointed
to a meeting between the vice-president of legal and compliance
and the audit committee, but the minutes indicated that they
talked only about “significant matters and trends.”179 This circumspect wording prevented the court from inferring that the
meeting included a discussion about ongoing violations of law by
company employees, or about a federal investigation concerning
these violations.180 Even when reports of the federal investigation appeared in an internal memo, there was no evidence that
the memo ever reached the board, or that it was discussed in
subsequent meetings with legal officers.181 Similarly, in In re
SAIC, a whistleblower report that never reached the board failed
to rise to a Caremark red flag.182 In the court’s own words, “Delaware courts have consistently rejected . . . the inference that directors must have known about a problem because someone was
supposed to tell them about it.”183
In plaintiffs’ quest to document board awareness, finding
even a single email message warning about the problem might
seem like a real treasure. But courts have been reluctant to rely
on one or even a few communications in order to establish scienter, especially if these communications are not entirely unambiguous. The court was faced with such a communication in In
re AIG, the derivative suit concerning the board’s liability following the insurance giant’s near-collapse at the height of the 2007
financial crisis due to excessive risk in its credit default swaps.184
Nine months before the government rescued AIG, the company’s
auditors, Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC), had submitted two
warnings to the board’s audit committee about potential weaknesses in risk management, without providing additional information about the type or extent of the problem.185 PwC also

179. No. CV 12290-VCS, 2017 WL 242571, at *4 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2017).
180. Id. at *12 (stating that the plaintiff ’ s argument that board minutes labeled “significant matters and trends” must have included a conversation regarding the company’s compliance violations is “wholly conclusory”).
181. Id.
182. In re SAIC Inc. Derivative Litig., 948 F. Supp. 2d 366, 382 (S.D.N.Y.
2013), aff ’ d sub nom. Welch v. Havenstein, 553 F. App’x 54 (2d Cir. 2014).
183. Cottrell ex rel. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Duke, 829 F.3d 983, 995 (8th
Cir. 2016).
184. In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Derivative Litig., 700 F. Supp. 2d 419, 424–30
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff ’ d, 415 F. App’x 285 (2d Cir. 2011).
185. Id. at 427.
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warned some senior executives, but these were not board members.186 These few and tentative admonitions were not enough to
convince the court that AIG’s board was aware of the underlying
problems.187
Apart from reports and emails, plaintiffs have sought to use
other indications of underlying trouble as evidence of board
awareness, such as personnel moves. Delaware courts have been
responsive to this claim only is so far as the departure was
“noisy,” i.e., the employee explicitly stated that disagreements
with company practices were behind the move. In In re AIG, the
Vice President of Accounting Policy resigned due to differences
of opinion regarding credit default swaps, but neither he nor anyone else communicated to the board the circumstances of his
resignation.188 The court readily concluded that, on its own, the
departure of a senior employee did not suffice to alert the board
about potential misgivings.189
A special type of warning for the board comes in the form of
press articles regarding violations of law by the company. Particularly when these articles appear in major newspapers of wide
circulation, courts assume that directors were aware of them
without demanding specific evidence that they read them.190
However, the article must provide specific information for violations of law, at least to the exclusion of other hypotheses.191
2. What Constitutes a Red Flag?
Neither Caremark nor Stone, the leading Delaware cases,
provide any specific guidance on what constitutes an appropriate
red flag. But by grounding the board’s monitoring duties on good
faith, Stone circumscribes the set of circumstances that would

186. Id. at 436.
187. Id. at 435–38.
188. Id. at 436–37.
189. Compare id. (rejecting the claim that the departure of the Vice President of Accounting Policy was a red flag pertaining to the company’s accounting
practices), with Rosenbloom v. Pyott, 765 F.3d 1137, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2014)
(accepting the claim that an employee’s resignation after filing an ethics complaint against the company’s sales division was a red flag pertaining to sales
practices).
190. In re SAIC Inc. Derivative Litig., 948 F. Supp. 2d 366, 370–75 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (noting that the plaintiffs relied on a Washington Post editorial), aff ’ d
sub nom. Welch v. Havenstein, 553 F. App’x 54 (2d Cir. 2014).
191. Id. at 386 (“[T]here may well be exceptional cases where news coverage
of corporate illegality is so intense, widespread, and unavoidable that no member of the business public could credibly claim to have missed it.”).
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allow courts to conclude that a red flag has been raised.192 Plaintiffs have repeatedly tried to push the boundaries of what is a
red flag, without much success. The section below begins with
some approaches that were ultimately thwarted at court, and
concludes with examples of red flags that courts recognized.
In their regular course of business, boards receive much information about the company, both about its past performance
and about its future prospects and risks. Even though each tidbit
of information is not, on its own, a red flag of illegality, combining these could help the board realize that illegal activity is underway. Although this approach overcomes the hurdle of showing that the board was aware of the information in question,
courts are unwilling to infer illegality unless faced with clear evidence. One such example concerns the board in In re SAIC,
which concerned a government procurement company responsible for a project that eventually cost ten times its initial
budget.193 A series of press articles had criticized both SAIC’s
overpaid employees and relaxed management, as well as the government’s repeated decisions to extend the project despite subpar results and cost overruns.194 In the end, SAIC employees
were paying kickbacks to government officials in order to continue with the project.195 However, the court refused to infer that
the board was aware of the illegal practices.196
Insistence upon concrete proof of both illegality and board
awareness divided the Delaware Supreme Court in City of Birmingham v. Duke Energy, a ruling that illustrates the limits of
circumstantial evidence.197 The board of Duke Energy had received an avalanche of warnings over the years regarding pollutants seeping from its coal ash ponds into the drinking water
sources in the area surrounding one of its plants.198 When the
company self-reported, the local state regulator imposed a very
small fine and demanded minimal compliance reforms that did
not go as far as environmental specialists had recommended.199

192. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del.
2006) (“[A] showing of bad faith conduct . . . is essential to establish director
oversight liability . . . .”).
193. In re SAIC Inc., 948 F. Supp. 2d at 370–75.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 387–92.
197. 177 A.3d 47 (Del. 2017).
198. Id. at 56–57.
199. Id. at 60–61.
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Eventually, a burst pipe proved the specialists right.200 According to the court majority, the board had relied in good faith on
the adequacy of the regulator’s mandated reforms because, despite some of Duke’s managers contributing to the regulators’
election campaigns, there was no evidence of collusion between
management and the regulator.201 Thus absent direct proof of
quid pro quo corruption, the majority was unwilling to go any
further to hold directors liable.202 But Chief Justice Strine dissented, arguing that the board was aware of the specialists’ recommendations, and therefore the inadequacy of the compliance
reforms undertaken.203 In his view, a proper red flag was in
place, and no further evidence was required.204
In industries where regulatory risk is high, and vigilance
about enforcement actions is constant, boards obtain frequent
assessments of the company’s performance of its regulatory obligations, or its exposure to a constantly changing legal landscape. Typically, these assessments are the product of outside
experts, such as auditors205 or external counsel,206 or in-house
legal teams. Plaintiffs have urged courts to read these assessments as warnings about underlying violations, and argue that
they constitute “red flags” in the Caremark sense. However,
courts are unwilling to accept that a report pointing to higher
risk of violations amounts to a red flag, unless it is accompanied
by actual examples of violations that are already happening or
have recently happened. In Reiter v. Fairbank, the board of Capital One had received at least twenty-five reports between 2011
and 2014 about the bank’s escalating exposure to anti-money
laundering compliance risk, but none pointed to a confirmed
money laundering case.207 The court declined to rely on these
risk reports as a Caremark red flag, falling in line with the courts
in In re AIG208 and In re Goldman Sachs,209 which all recognized
200. Id. at 64.
201. Id. at 61.
202. Id. at 62–64.
203. Id. at 65 (Strine, J., dissenting).
204. Id.
205. In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Derivative Litig., 700 F. Supp. 2d 419, 437
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff ’ d, 415 F. App’x 285 (2d Cir. 2011).
206. In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Derivative Litig., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1044,
1059 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
207. No. CV 11693-CB, 2016 WL 6081823, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2016).
208. 700 F. Supp. 2d at 427.
209. In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. CIV.A. 5215-VCG,
2011 WL 4826104, at *22 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011).
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that a warning about the risk of violations is different than a
warning about an actual violation.210
When courts do recognize that the board violated its monitoring duties under Caremark, they tend to rely on multiple and
undisputed red flags from diverse sources. A recent high profile
case where plaintiffs succeeded on a Caremark claim involved
Allergan, the producer of Botox, and its efforts to promote offlabel uses of the drug despite the express prohibition of the statute.211 The red flags for the board came both from internal
sources and from regulators.212 A senior ethics employee resigned after only six weeks at Allergan, citing her concerns about
prohibited promotions of off-label uses for Botox in a complaint
discussed at a board meeting.213 The FDA sent five repeated
warnings to Allergan, expressing its concern about potential prohibited promotions, even though it did not launch a full investigation until it became frustrated with the company.214 Besides
these red flags, the court underlined that the surrounding circumstances of the case supported a finding of bad faith.215 Botox
was Allergan’s main product, and the board closely monitored its
sales and post-sale customer service, instituting client hot lines
and targeting physicians whose specialty suggested off-label
uses.216 Moreover, the sheer volume of sales for Botox far exceeded the instances of approved uses in the country, suggesting
that over seventy to eighty percent of the drug was directed towards off-label uses.217 Success of this scale could not have been
achieved without active promotion.218 This realization provided
the court not only with a strong indication of board awareness,
but also with a motive.219 This confluence of factors convinced
the court that the board had violated its duty to monitor employees, even though plaintiffs were not able to produce a specific
board decision to actually authorize off-label uses.220
Other high profile wins for plaintiffs in Caremark claims offer a similar combination of internal reports raising red flags
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. at *8–15.
Rosenbloom v. Pyott, 765 F.3d 1137, 1141–47 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1152–54.
Id. at 1153–54.
Id. at 1153.
Id. at 1154.
Id. at 1143–45.
Id. at 1142.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1159.
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with circumstantial evidence of board awareness. In In re Countrywide, internal witnesses testified that they had spoken to the
CEO about the bank’s inaccurate risk measurement, which
flouted regulatory requirements.221 While the witnesses had not
communicated these concerns to the whole board, the court
pointed to the increasing rate of delinquencies in key loan categories, which exceeded two thirds of all borrowers.222 That such
an overwhelming reversal of fortunes was not reflected in bank
reports could not have gone unnoticed by the board. At the same
time, the prevalence of trades by board members provided the
court with an additional motive for the delayed recognition of the
problem.223
F. HAS THE BOARD RESPONDED APPROPRIATELY TO RED FLAGS?
By documenting problems and informing the board, the
chief compliance officer will have fulfilled the main expectation
our legal system places on her, and utilized one of the main
weapons in her arsenal. After that move, conventional wisdom
suggests, it is up to the board to decide how best to respond, taking advantage of the discretion afforded by the business judgment rule. In reality, we argue, the board’s options are much
narrower.
In essence, the board has two options. It can disregard the
red flags, and face the consequences, if or when they arise. Alternatively, it can respond to these red flags, showing that it intends to address the compliance gaps brought to its attention
and combat the underlying violations identified. The first option,
disregarding the red flags, comes with a significant gamble for
directors, who run the risk of being found personally liable in
case a problem arises. Directors succumbing to a successful
Caremark claim are not typically protected by directors and officers liability insurance, since they are found to have acted in
bad faith. Generally, directors are loath to undertake personal
liability, which can come with significant pecuniary and reputational losses, after protracted and expensive litigation. Independent directors, who now form the majority in most boards in
public corporations, are thought to be particularly averse to this
221. In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Derivative Litig., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1044,
1060 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
222. Id. at 1061–62 (“The second red flag . . . relates to the increased delinquencies in the . . . riskiest loan categories that Countrywide held for investment.”).
223. Id. at 1066–67.

2176

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[103:2135

risk, since they will be gambling away their life’s worth in service of top managers’ restless pursuit of higher profits.
Of course, boards can opt to respond to red flags, fulfilling
their duties so as to overcome any shareholder challenges.
Boards still have wide latitude to formulate their reaction as
they see fit. They can decide whether a separate board committee is needed, what type of staffing or other resources might be
required, or whether to hire outside help in order to set up a new
compliance initiative. Nevertheless, the yardstick by which
board reaction will be assessed is defined, in large part, by the
reports that identified the compliance gaps and underlying violations in the first place. These reports set the end towards
which the board must strive, even if it is free to choose the particular means it will utilize to do so.
The paragraphs below describe instances where the board
chose to disregard red flags, and contrast them with cases where
the board sought to address the red flags that had been raised,
some successfully and some less so. They illustrate that, if the
board wants to avoid violating its duty of loyalty, it really has to
undertake concrete and effective action. Otherwise, directors expose themselves to serious repercussions, having lost all credibility in the eyes of the court.
1. Boards in Disregard of Red Flags
After courts establish that adequate red flags had indeed
reached the board, they move on to the next stage of their analysis, identifying and evaluating board reactions. If the board has
not really set in motion any response to the problem underlined
by the red flags, then courts are likely to view inactivity as evidence of bad faith. Two characteristic examples involve pharmaceutical companies that, after having been fined by federal regulators for illegally promoting drugs’ off-label uses, continued to
do so.224 As a result of the federal fines, both companies established extensive new and stronger compliance mechanisms.225
224. Rosenbloom v. Pyott, 765 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2014) (involving Allergan,
Inc.); In re Pfizer Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 722 F. Supp. 2d 453 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (involving Pfizer, Inc.); La. Mun. Police Emp.’s Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d
313 (Del. Ch. 2012) (involving Allergan, Inc.).
225. Pfizer, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (“The 2002 CIA [corporate integrity agreement] required, among other things, that Pfizer’s board would create and implement a compliance mechanism that would bring information about illegal
marketing activities to the board’s attention.”); La. Mun. Police, 46 A.3d at 321
(“As part of the settlement, Allergan entered into a five-year Corporate Integrity
Agreement . . . . The agreement mandates that Allergan implement a strict
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But as these compliance departments set to work, supposedly
reporting ongoing violations to the board itself, the board took
no measure to constrain illegal activity.226 No violators were reprimanded or fired, no new training was ordered, and no additional screening processes were set up. In reality, these boards
did not end illegal promotions, presumably because it was highly
profitable. In both cases, the boards chose to intensify their offlabel promotion efforts.227
Eventually, both boards’ lack of response despite such clear
and ongoing red flags helped courts conclude that the boards
were acting in bad faith. After a while, federal regulators
brought new enforcement actions resulting in record-high payments, which reached a total of $2.3 billion in Pfizer’s case.228
Pfizer shareholders complained about an absence of board action
that was so troubling because the newly discovered violations
closely traced past misconduct, despite clear internal compliance
warnings in the interim.229 In both cases, courts swiftly concluded that boards’ lack of reaction amounted to a violation of
their duties.230
2. Boards Respond to Red Flags
Many boards do not remain aloof in the face of red flags, but
take the initiative to address the revealed problems. In formulating their response, boards can rely on the flexibility afforded
by the business judgment rule. However, if its response is
deemed clearly inadequate, the specter of bad faith can still
haunt the board. Courts need to be convinced that boards’
compliance program . . . .”).
226. Rosenbloom, 765 F.3d at 1153 (“Given how carefully the Board was
monitoring Botox sales, its relative inaction in the face of these repeated FDA
warnings supports a finding of liability.”); Pfizer, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 456 (“In the
face of all these prior violations by its subsequently-acquired subsidiaries, and
despite its promises to take significant steps to monitor and prevent any further
violations, Pfizer itself engaged in the same misconduct . . . Pfizer kept careful
track of how well their illegal activities were succeeding.”).
227. Rosenbloom, 765 F.3d at 1142–44, 1146 (detailing the many FDA warning letters Allergan received since 2001, and noting the continuation of the illegal drug use promotion from 1997 to 2010); Pfizer, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 456 (noting
that Pfizer expanded its departments and employed more sophisticated datamining techniques to identify potentially susceptible physicians).
228. See Gardiner Harris, Pfizer Pays $2.3 Billion to Settle Marketing Case,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/03/business/
03health.html.
229. Pfizer, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 457.
230. Id. at 463; Rosenbloom, 765 F.3d at 1154, 1159.
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measures are designed and intended to contain the problem, rather than simply work as smokescreen for any subsequent shareholder suit.
Rarely has a Delaware court repudiated a board’s actions in
more certain terms than in In re Massey.231 Then-Vice Chancellor Strine was aghast at the conduct of the CEO, who consistently ignored mandatory mining safety requirements, while publicly exclaiming that he knew more about mine conditions than
federal regulators.232 While the CEO’s articulate statements betrayed his bad faith, Strine still had to explore the state of mind
for the remaining members of the board, whose speech had been
more guarded.233 The red flags were plentiful. Federal regulators
had repeatedly fined the company, documenting thousands of violations per year.234 Internal reports were also damning.235 An
internal compliance officer who had documented the safety failures was swiftly fired, but brought a high-profile retaliation suit
against the company and won “punitive damages, back pay, and
emotional and reputational damages” of $2 million.236 Faced
with both external and internal warnings, Massey’s independent
directors decided to react. They formed an independent committee, met regularly with compliance officers, and even saw some
compliance metrics improve.237 But they failed to get any results
on the ground; in the years after the committee was established,
Massey’s violations increased in number, rather than falling.238
Nor was the committee successful in reining in the CEO.239
When a major mining accident hit the company, directors were
unable to convince the court of their good faith; the court portrayed director conduct as merely “going through the motions,”
and thus insufficient to counter the company’s endemic non-compliance.240
231. In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative & Class Action Litig., No.
5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *7–13 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011).
232. Id. at *7.
233. Id. at *15–16.
234. Id. at *6–8.
235. Id. at *6.
236. Id.
237. Id.; Certain Massey Defendants’ Answering Brief at 7–8, No. 5430-VCS,
(Del. Ch. May 24, 2011), 2011 WL 2138269; In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative
& Class Action Litig., No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011).
238. In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative & Class Action Litig., 2011 WL
2176479, at *7.
239. Id.
240. Id. at *19.
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In contrast, the Chancery Court praised United Parcel Service’s (UPS) board in Horman v. Abney241 for its reaction to red
flags. Just like Abbott and Pfizer, UPS was sanctioned by federal
regulators and undertook to install compliance reforms in the
context of the settlement with authorities.242 After a few years,
when illegal cigarette shipments reemerged, UPS became aware
of various potential problems through a presentation from its legal team and an internal business development memorandum.243 But rather than remaining distant, UPS’s board took action. It instituted new digital screening techniques to better
identify violators, it streamlined and strengthened the investigation process, it ordered new and more targeted employee training, and created a dedicated help line to invite whistleblower reports against offenders.244 When the Audit Committee received
notice from regulators that they were planning to investigate
certain UPS outposts, they launched their own internal investigations and either confirmed a problem or concluded that there
were no violations.245 Overall, these initiatives convinced the
court that UPS’s board was actively trying to combat illegal shipments, rather than tolerating or encouraging them.
III. SECURITIES LAWS’ SCIENTER AND INTERNAL
REPORTS
In Part II above we showed that, in response to Stone’s246
renewed emphasis on bad faith, courts looked for hard evidence
in communications between the board and the company’s legal
and compliance professionals, boosting compliance departments’
influence. A parallel jurisprudential arc was already under way
in federal securities law in 2006, when Stone was issued,247 and
has become even more salient in the last ten years. Rule 10b5,248 the most common basis for securities class actions, requires
plaintiffs to establish scienter, typically by showing that defendants were aware of fraud in the company’s disclosures. Importantly, the landmark 2007 Supreme Court ruling in Tellabs
241. Horman v. Abney, No. 12290-VCS, 2017 WL 242571, at *4 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 19, 2017).
242. Id. at *3–4.
243. Id. at *4–5.
244. Id. at *3, 10, 13–14.
245. Id. at *13–14.
246. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del.
2006).
247. See Sale, supra note 133, at 720, 750, 755.
248. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018).
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v. Makor raised the evidentiary standards for scienter at the
pleading stage.249 Thus, securities plaintiffs have to show that
the board received information contradictory to its public statements, just like fiduciary duty plaintiffs must establish that the
board received information about employees’ illegal activities.
This important resemblance between the two doctrines has been
widely recognized by academic commentators and Delaware
courts alike.250
The quest for hard evidence of board awareness makes internal communications between corporate leaders and their subordinates as valuable in federal securities suits as they are in
Caremark claims. Among such exchanges, reports submitted by
legal and compliance personnel are often the most conspicuous,
comprehensive, and illuminating. By administering the channels connecting the board with its corporate subordinates and
the outside world, legal and compliance professionals become the
arbiters of the board’s state of mind.
In this Part, we track the emergence of legal and compliance
personnel as key players in securities suits, which further enhances their influence in the modern corporate hierarchy. Securities class actions, which overwhelmingly rely on 10b-5, far outpace fiduciary duty suits in number or size of damages claimed,
reaching a Maximum Dollar Loss Index of $300 billion in the
first six months of 2017 alone.251 The threat of such large damage claims makes it harder for boards and management to disregard legal and compliance personnel. We begin by illustrating
how central the state of mind inquiry is in this body of case law.
We show that concepts that are familiar from our discussion of
bad faith in Part II above, such as red flags and motives, are tools
that courts often use in the securities fraud context as well. For
all these reasons, we argue, federal securities jurisprudence further amplifies the influence of in-house legal experts.
A. FRAUD AND STATE OF MIND IN FEDERAL SECURITIES
DOCTRINE
Private enforcement of securities laws is a mainstay in the
arsenal of shareholder complaints against management and
boards. Once courts interpreted Rule 10b-5 to imply private
rights of action for shareholders,252 class actions have continued
249.
250.
251.
252.

Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007).
See infra Part III.C.
See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 29, at 8.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737–38, 749
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to lay siege to the corporate bastion. Concerned that frivolous
securities suits disrupt board operation and increase the costs of
doing business, both Congress and the Supreme Court have
tightened the state of mind requirements in 10b-5 and demanded stricter evidence for meeting them. As a result, the federal securities law doctrine and state fiduciary duty law now
closely parallel each other, as regards both substantive requirements and evidentiary standards. The paragraphs below outline
the substantive similarities, while Section III.B below focuses on
evidentiary aspects.
A culpable state of mind is at the center of both fiduciary
duty claims and federal securities claims. Under 10b-5, a misleading statement or omission does not in itself generate liability, unless it was made with scienter, typically equated with intent to defraud or at least knowledge of doing so.253 Thus, a
blameworthy mindset is an indispensable element of securities
fraud, without which a misleading statement remains a regrettable accident.254 Of course, intent and knowledge are key constituents of bad faith under fiduciary duty law, as discussed
above. Despite some initial ambivalence, most courts today accept that scienter also extends to recklessness, described as conscious disregard of consequences so obvious that the actor must
have been aware of them.255 As a result, scienter closely resembles bad faith in state fiduciary law.256
A potential divergence between federal and state doctrines
is that the culpable actor under federal law is, typically, the corporation that issued the securities, while Caremark targets the
individual directors of the board. In practice, courts have bridged
that difference. As corporations are fictional entities, courts infer
scienter by examining the state of mind of the person who made
the infringing statements or omissions, ordinarily the company’s

(1975).
253. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
254. See Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 532
(2011) (“[A]ny conception of fraud must include consideration of the mental
state or fault requirements that will apply to the actor’s awareness.”).
255. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12:52, at 629 (7th ed. 2016).
256. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 63 (Del.
2006).
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top executive.257 By dismissing collective approaches to scienter,258 courts have placed individuals at the center of the inquiry,
just as they have done in the Caremark context.
Despite the overwhelming similarities in the concepts of scienter and bad faith, there are significant differences in other aspects of the two doctrines. As a substantive matter, the scope of
the federal securities laws’ antifraud provisions is much broader,
extending over any instance of fraudulent misstatement or misleading omission in companies’ disclosures. For example, 10b-5
violations include insider trading, which falls outside the scope
of Caremark duties. Only a subset of cases could be brought both
under the Caremark framework and under 10b-5, typically when
the faulty disclosure concerns illegal activities by company employees.259 Moreover, enforcement institutions for the two regimes are only partially overlapping. While Caremark claims
can be brought only by shareholders, federal disclosure violations can also be enforced by the SEC, and sometimes the DOJ,
if they give rise to criminal liability. The SEC also has at its disposal Section 17 of the 1933 Act260, the last prong of which does
not require scienter in order to establish fraud, but relies on negligence only.261 But private plaintiffs typically beat the SEC in
257. See Bradley J. Bondi, Dangerous Liaisons: Collective Scienter in SEC
Enforcement Actions, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 8 (2009) (“Seven circuits have rejected collective scienter in favor of the traditional approach to corporate scienter that requires proof that the person responsible for the misstatement had
scienter.”).
258. See City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651,
688 (6th Cir. 2005); Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Sols., Inc., 365 F.3d
353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004) (“For purposes of determining whether a statement
made by the corporation was made by it with the requisite Rule 10(b) scienter
we believe it appropriate to look to the state of mind of the individual corporate
official . . . rather than generally to the collective knowledge of all the corporation’s officers and employees acquired in the course of their employment.”).
259. In addition to providing accurate disclosure to investors, federal securities laws require corporate boards to maintain a reasonable system of internal
controls, in accordance with Section 13(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.
15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012). Although this provision was added with the passage of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the 1970s, it does not provide any private
rights of action, and the SEC was reluctant to utilize it for many decades. 15
U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1; see Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe’s
Shadow: The SEC’s Pursuit of Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q.
449, 454 (2001). More recently, the SEC has been bringing enforcement actions
based on § 13(b). These actions would offer further support for our argument.
260. 15 U.S.C. § 78q.
261. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697–700 (1980). While this might mean
that SEC actions are somewhat broader than private plaintiffs’ ones, they rarely
reach trial, and thus it is hard to know the impact of the different standard. See
Buell, supra note 254, at 554 (“These [SEC] cases—though not subject to the
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bringing a civil lawsuit for faulty disclosure, and the SEC joins
about fifteen percent of these cases.262 Thus, private 10b-5 class
actions, though not the sole basis for federal securities law enforcement, certainly loom large.
B. PLEADING AND PROVING SCIENTER
Providing hard evidence of a perpetrator’s state of mind is
notoriously elusive.263 It is little surprise, then, that Congress
and courts chose to raise the evidentiary burden regarding scienter in an effort to suppress the volume of 10b-5 litigation
which, according to critics, had gotten out of hand. In particular,
the Supreme Court’s 2007 ruling in Tellabs v. Makor emphasized
the need for plaintiffs to provide evidence at the pleading stage
showing that fraud is “at least as likely” as alternative hypotheses.264 To successfully plead scienter, plaintiffs need direct evidence that a top executive was aware of specific facts that rendered her statement misleading or untrue. Absent such
evidence, federal courts have refused to infer knowledge on the
part of a top officer by virtue only of her high managerial position, powers, and responsibilities.265 If they subscribed to this
view, federal judges argued, scienter would be established in
every case there was an error or omission, however accidental.266
These concerns echo Chancellor Allen’s own fears when shaping
the Caremark doctrine.267
In contrast, internal reports that establish top executives
awareness are what courts see as the clearest evidence of scienter.268 These must be specific: dates, sources, and discussion of
special pleading rules for private lawsuits—almost uniformly settle.”).
262. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics:
An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 777 (2003).
263. See Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 773, 791
(2004) (“Plaintiffs generally do not have direct evidence going to the defendant’s
subjective state of mind at the motion to dismiss stage.”).
264. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 328 (2007).
265. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading After Tellabs, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 507,
518–19 (2009) (“Still, however, the mere fact that someone was in a high position at a company is not enough, in itself, to create a strong inference that the
person knew that his statements were false.”).
266. See Garfield v. NDC Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1266 (11th Cir. 2006); City
of Brockton Ret. Sys. v. Shaw Grp. Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 464, 474 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
267. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–68 (Del.
Ch. 1996).
268. Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1068 (9th
Cir. 2008).
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contents are needed.269 Negative internal reports must be directly communicated and unambiguously drafted; scienter cannot be inferred from general allegations, or even from meetings
whose content was never recorded.270 Clearly drafted internal
reports are much more valuable than second-hand accounts by
staff, such as internal auditors, accountants, or clerks, whose often anonymous testimony is not uniformly accepted in all
courts.271 Courts’ pressing request for a paper trail connecting
the top executive with the violation underlines the fundamental
role of legal and compliance officers, who are often in charge of
internal reporting.
Another similarity with the fiduciary duty doctrine is the
increasing importance of red flags in pleading scienter. Absent
direct evidence of a top manager’s awareness, courts are often
wary of “fraud by hindsight.”272 To overcome this concern, plaintiffs typically claim that disclosures’ faults were so obvious and
severe that managers were reckless in not recognizing red
flags.273 Characteristic red flags include whistleblower reports,
or noisy withdrawals of internal auditors and compliance
staff.274 These are typically handled by in-house legal experts,
whose contribution is essential in molding them into appropriate
red flags for the purposes of 10b-5 litigation.
C. RECOGNIZING THE PARALLELS BETWEEN SCIENTER AND BAD
FAITH
The parallels between scienter in 10b-5 actions and the
Caremark framework are unmistakable. Just as fiduciary duty
jurisprudence establishes bad faith only if the board had specific
information about illegal employee conduct, 10b-5 jurisprudence
finds scienter only if the board had similarly specific information
that contradicted their disclosures. Courts have explicitly recognized this similarity time and again, and Delaware courts have
269. Id. (quoting In re Vantive Corp. Sec. Litig., 283 F.3d 1079, 1087–88 (9th
Cir. 2002)).
270. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 985 (9th Cir.
1999); Greenberg v. Cooper Cos., Inc., No. 11-CV-05697, 2013 WL 100206, at *5
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2013).
271. See Gideon Mark, Confidential Witnesses in Securities Litigation, 36 J.
CORP. L. 551, 555 (2011).
272. See Gulati et al., supra note 263, at 791.
273. See Dain C. Donelson & Robert A. Prentice, Scienter Pleading and Rule
10b-5: Empirical Analysis and Behavioral Implications, 63 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 441, 471–72 (2012).
274. Id. at 474.
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repeatedly treated the two concepts as equivalent.275 In In re
Citigroup, the Delaware Supreme Court went as far as suggesting that the scienter-based approach to bad faith ultimately provides to independent directors the same safeguards available to
them under federal law.276 These statements suggest that Delaware judges are only too well acquainted with plaintiffs’ tactics,
and perhaps share some of the concerns that justify constraining
class actions. But no one anticipated, we argue, that stricter evidence standards would boost the role of in-house officials tasked
with documenting the internal life of the corporation.
IV. PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR LEGAL AND
COMPLIANCE OFFICERS
So far, we have argued that by increasing evidentiary standards on state of mind, Delaware state law and federal securities
laws ended up empowering legal and compliance experts, who
are uniquely well-placed to access that evidence. But their empowerment has other roots too, arising from a growing body of
law focusing on legal and compliance experts as internal monitors who can prevent wrongdoing. While it is still rare, legal and
compliance officers face a growing risk of personal liability.277
This threat, we argue, further strengthens their bargaining position vis-à-vis directors and managers. Armed with a new legal
mandate to set up supervision mechanisms, to investigate, and
ultimately to report, legal and compliance experts can resist
pressures to adopt evasive techniques. We discuss three common
sources of personal liability: laws passed post-financial crisis to
275. See, e.g., In re Am. Apparel, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., No. CV
10-06576 MMM (RCx), 2012 WL 9506072, at *22 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2012) (stating that the Caremark framework is the legal standard that Delaware courts
use to determine whether a director faces a substantial likelihood of liability for
failure to monitor and properly supervise a company’s operations); Reiter ex rel.
Capital One Fin. Corp. v. Fairbank, No. CV 11693-CB, 2016 WL 6081823, at *8
(Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2016) (discussing the Caremark framework in the context of
director oversight over company operations); In re Massey Energy Co., C.A. No.
5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *22 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011) (stating that “[t]he
Caremark liability standard . . . requires proof that a director acted inconsistent
with his fiduciary duties and, most importantly, that the director knew he was
so acting”).
276. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2D 106, 125
(Del. Ch. 2009).
277. See DANIEL J. HURSON, COMPLIANCE OFFICER LIABILITY—A GROWING
OCCUPATIONAL HAZARD 5 (2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/events/labor_law/2017/11/conference/papers/Hurson-COMPLIANCE
-OFFICER-LIABILITY-A-GROWING-OCCUPATIONAL-HAZARD.pdf (discussing the SEC’s posture regarding chief compliance officer liability).
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give in-house legal experts access to, and increased influence
over, the board and management; the Delaware fiduciary duty
framework; and criminal liability, such as for obstruction of justice.
A. PERSONAL LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF FAILURE TO OVERSEE
COMPLIANCE REGIMES
The 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act marks the first time that Congress gave the SEC the authority to discipline lawyers.278 The
Act clarifies that the general counsel will “be primarily responsible for investigating and advising the board and senior management on how to address reports of material violations.”279 The
legislative history reveals that the bill’s drafters believed that
inside counsel have the power and the responsibility to prevent
corporate misconduct.280 It did not take long for the SEC to begin
advising general counsel to assert their authority to the board.281
Sometimes, regulators consider compliance officers’ powers
so central that their inactions render them complicit, as if they
enabled the fraud. In a watershed case, U.S. criminal authorities
and regulators brought suit against Thomas Haider, the former
Chief Compliance Officer of MoneyGram, the money transfer retailer.282 Haider marks the first time a compliance officer was
targeted for failure to design appropriate supervision systems so
as to constrain violations of the anti-money laundering statutes,
a highly sophisticated compliance regime.283 The lawsuit
278. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 784
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245).
279. Kim, supra note 14, at 1036 (“SEC officials have urged general counsels
to play a more active role in policing compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley through
the development of a more assertive relationship with the board and management.”).
280. 148 CONG. REC. S6524, S6551–52 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement
of Sen. John Edwards) (“If executives and/or accountants are breaking the law,
you can be sure that part of the problem is that the lawyers who are there and
involved are not doing their jobs.”).
281. Alan Beller, the Director of the Division of Corporation Finance of the
SEC, recommended that general counsels claim “[a] place at the table at every
significant discussion about how [her] company should act with respect to every
important issue raised by Sarbanes-Oxley, [SEC] rules or other aspects of the
new environment.” Alan L. Beller, Remarks Before the American Bar Association’s 2003 Conference for Corporate Counsel (June 12, 2003), https://www.sec
.gov/news/speech/spch061203alb.htm. Beller also emphasized that general
counsels should seek “[a]ccess to the board . . . to assure good behavior.” Id.
282. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Haider, No. 15-CV-01518 (DSD/HB), 2016 WL
107940, at *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2016).
283. See Sue Reisinger, Feds Settle First Ever Civil Suit Against Financial

2019]

HIDDEN POWER OF COMPLIANCE

2187

claimed that Haider was aware that MoneyGram agents participated in consumer fraud phishing schemes, since he had received thousands of complaints.284 However, he did not investigate these complaints, fire any of the participating agents, or
take measures to close the compliance loopholes that allowed the
schemes.285 Settled in 2017 for a $250,000 civil sanction and a
bar from the industry, the case represents the highest fine paid
out of pocket by a compliance officer.286 While still infrequent,
since Haider, there have been a number of examples of the SEC
targeting compliance officers individually for “turning a blind
eye” to corporate wrongdoing.287 For example, in In re Meade, the
SEC sanctioned the chief compliance officer for ignoring an insider trading scam although he was aware of the employee’s insider status.288
But compliance officers’ liability is not necessarily tethered
to some other misconduct. Rather, the mere existence of gaps in
compliance programs has led to personal liability. The SEC
brought proceedings against big, well-known firms with large
compliance departments, namely Blackrock’s investment advisory arm289 and SFX Financial.290 In contrast to Meade, where
the SEC alleged that the CCO all but blessed insider trading and
expected to profit from it, the CCOs in Blackrock and SFX were
not aware of the underlying misconduct.291 But both CCOs were

Chief Compliance Officer, LAW.COM (May 8, 2017), https://www.law.com/
corpcounsel/sites/corpcounsel/2017/05/05/feds-settle-first-ever-civil-suit
-against-financial-chief-compliance-officer.
284. See Complaint at 16–18, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Haider, No. CV
15-1518 (DSD/HB), 2016 WL 107940 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2016) (describing
MoneyGram’s fraudulent activity, including Haider’s knowledge of that activity).
285. Id.
286. See Former MoneyGram Executive Settles Closely Watched U.S. Money
Laundering Case, REUTERS (May 4, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us
-moneygram-intl-moneylaundering/former-moneygram-executive-settles
-closely-watched-u-s-money-laundering-case-idUSKBN1802P3.
287. See, e.g., In re Thomas E. Meade, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
3855, 2014 WL 2601711, at *3–8 (June 11, 2014) (finding that Meade’s behavior
allowed an employee to participate in insider trading).
288. Id.
289. See In re Blackrock Advisors, LLC & Bartholomew A. Battista, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4065, 2015 WL 1776222, at *1 (Apr. 20, 2015).
290. See In re SFX Fin. Advisory Mgmt. Enters., Inc. & Eugene S. Mason,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4116, 2015 WL 3653814, at *1 (June 15,
2015).
291. See id. at *3; In re Blackrock Advisors, 2015 WL 1776222, at *7–8.
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aware of gaps in their compliance program.292 The fines agreed
to upon settlement were somewhat lower, and no bar from the
securities industry was imposed.293 No matter; both compliance
officers were ordered to pay substantial fines out of pocket.294 In
this respect, the Blackrock and SFX settlements seem even more
draconian.
B. PERSONAL LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF DELAWARE FIDUCIARY
LAW
As we discussed above, in In re World Health Alternatives,
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware extended
Caremark liability to an officer, the general counsel, for the first
time.295 The court reasoned that the duties of officers and directors are identical under Delaware law and held the general counsel personally liable for failure to prevent corporate fraud.296 Significantly, the court extended this personal liability even though
the general counsel did not have knowledge of or involvement in
the underlying conduct, nor did he benefit from it.297 For this
reason, In re World Health Alternatives went far beyond Section
307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which requires counsel to report
a material violation of the law of which she has actual
knowledge.298 In contrast, and similar to Blackrock and SFX, In
re World Health Alternatives requires that in-house counsel take
affirmative steps to provide oversight and “safeguard against
corporate wrongdoing.”299
C. PERSONAL LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF CRIMINAL LAW
Regulators are aware that legal and compliance professionals can conceal critical information about illegal activity by delaying the production of documents, scapegoating lower-level
employees, and “aggressively promoting exculpatory evidence
292. In re SFX Fin. Advisory Mgmt., 2015 WL 3653814, at *3; In re Blackrock
Advisors, 2015 WL 1776222, at *7–8.
293. In re Blackrock Advisors, 2015 WL 1776222, at *4–5.
294. Id. at *3.
295. See In re World Health Alts., Inc., 385 B.R. 576, 591–92 (Bankr. D. Del.
2008) (reasoning that a corporation’s general counsel must be held responsible
for failure of oversight under Caremark due to their status as a corporate officer).
296. See id. at 592.
297. See id. at 589–93.
298. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat.
745, 784 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245).
299. See In re World Health Alts., Inc., 385 B.R at 590.
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while dismissing clear and identifiable red flags.”300 Recently,
enforcement authorities have shown their resolve in bringing
cases against such legal and compliance professionals.
Volkswagen’s $4.3 billion settlement with the Department of
Justice for obstruction of justice is one such example.301 In-house
lawyers are obligated to preserve all documents relevant to an
anticipated litigation.302 Volkswagen (VW) admitted that an inhouse counsel, who remains anonymous, gave advice which
caused employees to delete documents.303 As part of the plea bargain, VW paid $2.8 billion in fines for the failed litigation hold
alone.304 VW’s “botched litigation hold” became an instant case
study within the legal community.305
Although cases against legal and compliance experts remain
rare, they have triggered a pervasive fear of liability in the profession,306 as evidenced by a proliferation of professional resources focused on how to avoid personal liability.307 Perhaps
counterintuitively, this fear of liability has strengthened the bargaining position of legal and compliance experts vis-à-vis the
board and management. While in the past they could afford to
300. See Robert S. Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enf ’ t, SEC, Remarks to Criminal
Law Group of the UJA-Federation of New York (June 1, 2011), https://www.sec
.gov/news/speech/2011/spch060111rk.htm.
301. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Volkswagen AG Agrees to
Plead Guilty and Pay $4.3 Billion in Criminal and Civil Penalties; Six
Volkswagen Executives and Employees are Indicted in Connection with Conspiracy to Cheat U.S. Emissions Tests (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/volkswagen-ag-agrees-plead-guilty-and-pay-43-billion-criminal-and
-civil-penalties-six.
302. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
303. See Thomas K. Potter III, VW’s $4.3BN Plea to Obstruction for Botched
Litigation Hold, BURR & FORMAN (Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.burr.com/blogs/
securities-litigation/2017/01/18/vws-4-3bn-plea-obstruction-botched-litigation
-hold (analyzing the legal implications of the Volkswagen case in regard to litigation holds).
304. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 301.
305. See Potter III, supra note 303 (analyzing the legal implications of the
Volkswagen case in regard to litigation holds).
306. According to a recent survey of compliance professionals, for example,
nearly fifty percent expected the personal liability of compliance officers to continue to increase in 2017. See STACEY ENGLISH & SUSANNAH HAMMOND, COST
OF COMPLIANCE 2017, at 5 (2017), https://d3kex6ty6anzzh.cloudfront.net/
uploads/a4/a496eba563ae8cde99b77caf83e101aaa5695580.pdf.
307. See generally id. (providing a survey of risk and compliance practitioners concerning “the cost of compliance and the challenges financial services expect to face in the year ahead”); see also DLA PIPER, DLA PIPER’S 2017 COMPLIANCE & RISK REPORT (2017), https://www.dlapiper.com/compliance_survey_
2017 (providing a survey of chief compliance officers in regard to “the current
state of corporate compliance in an era of deepening uncertainty”).
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be complicit, the specter of personal liability alters that equation.
V. THE HIDDEN POWER OF COMPLIANCE IN PRACTICE
In preceding Parts, we analyzed the doctrinal foundations of
modern compliance in state corporate law, federal securities law,
and personal liability for legal and compliance officers. In this
Part, we explore how these different bodies of law come together
in practice to form a coherent regime for governing corporate
misconduct. To examine compliance in practice, we turn to a series of mega corporate failures from the last few years—GM’s
ignition switch scandal,308 Washington Mutual’s mortgage crisis,309 Yahoo’s cyber-security breach,310 and Wells Fargo’s fake
accounts debacle.311 These cases captivated national attention
because of the enormous harm inflicted. Millions of people saw
their hard-earned money funneled to useless purposes, their privacy exposed to fraudsters, and their road safety fallen prey to
faulty engineering, resulting in deaths. Addressing these failures has attracted immense public resources, ranging from regulatory investigations and sanctions,312 to congressional attention,313 and judicial resolution.314 Thus, these cases are
emblematic of the corporate misconduct that compliance doctrine seeks to avert or sanction.
Yet, precisely because of the high stakes involved for shareholders, boards, and legal and compliance personnel, these mega
failures also represent the hardest test for our argument. If compliance processes can be easily sidestepped or manipulated to
exculpate corporate leaders, as critics claim, then such exculpation would be most valuable in these instances. Our case studies
show that, rather than the smokescreen critics purport it to be,
modern compliance often results in serious ramifications for the
corporate actors involved, including not only top executives and
board members, but also legal and compliance personnel.

308. See infra Part V.A.
309. See infra Part V.B.
310. See infra Part V.C.
311. See infra Part V.D.
312. See infra notes 326–29, 391, 394 and accompanying text.
313. See, e.g., Seth Fiegerman, Marissa Mayer Grilled by Congress Over
Massive Yahoo Security Breach, CNN BUS. (Nov. 8, 2017), https://money.cnn
.com/2017/11/08/technology/marissa-mayer-congress/index.html.
314. See, e.g., infra note 327 and accompanying text.
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In all the examples we discuss below, legal and compliance
personnel found themselves at the heart of the action, and their
reports and omissions were often the keystone in the legal case
against the board and management. Court rulings and settlement negotiations concentrated on what management and directors knew at specific points in time, and often fixated on the chief
legal officer or the head of compliance.315 In some instances,
these officers were named in shareholder complaints or targeted
by regulatory actions.316 This singular attention to legal and
compliance personnel illustrates that their choices, often surreptitious at the time they are made, can literally alter the legal
landscape for other corporate leaders.
However, our case studies also show significant variation in
liability outcomes. Directors and officers are not exonerated in
all but the most egregious cases,317 as critics would predict. Rather, the interactions between the board on the one hand, and
legal and compliance personnel on the other hand sometimes
lead to liability for the board, and sometimes increase legal risk
for the legal and compliance officer.318 We offer a typology of potential interactions between the board and its legal and compliance officers, and use the doctrinal analysis above to explain the
liability outcome in each type, which we illustrate with a separate case study. Table 1 organizes our case studies along two
axes. The y-axis displays the risk of liability faced by the
board,319 while the x-axis categorizes cases depending on
whether a chief legal or compliance officer faces a substantial
risk of liability. Below, we highlight how our case studies connect
to each other before delving into each one in greater detail.

315. See, e.g., infra Part V.D.1 (discussing the Wells Fargo banking scandal).
316. See, e.g., infra Part V.C.3 (discussing the suits brought by Yahoo’s
shareholders against the company’s executives).
317. See infra Part V.A.
318. See infra Part V.D.
319. Because some of our case studies include settlements, and others involve ongoing litigation, we cannot be entirely certain that they would result in
liability. Thus, we focus on the most likely outcome, based on the facts and admissions that have surfaced so far.
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Table 1. Liability Outcomes Depending on Different Communication
Strategies

Critics predict that legal and compliance personnel would
operate in the board’s favor, whether by overlooking violations
due to a biased check-the-box mentality or by actively colluding
to exonerate management. On the record, there are no formal
communications that could place either the board or legal and
compliance personnel in bad faith. Informal communications, if
any, remain untraceable, as the upper left quadrant’s heading
suggests. This pessimistic prediction is indeed borne out in the
GM ignition switch scandal. GM’s bureaucratic legal department
failed to notice the frequency of wrongful death suits connected
to a particular mechanical failure. Though regrettable, this failure to take note stops short of bad faith, as discussed above, thus
averting any liability for both the board and its chief legal officer.
Understandably, the outcome in this quadrant looms large in
scholarly discussions of compliance, since it lets both boards and
legal or compliance officers off the hook, despite the disastrous
repercussions of their omissions. But amidst the disparagement,
academic literature has overlooked the outcomes in the remaining three quadrants, which we bring to light. Essentially, we argue, the interests of legal and compliance officers do not always
align so closely with those of the board.
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In the bottom left quadrant, titled “traceable,” legal and
compliance personnel’s reports to the board are on the record,
clear and precise, thus representing the polar opposite of untraceable communications depicted in the upper left quadrant.
But while legal and compliance personnel vigorously examine
and report problems, the board chooses to ignore them. When
scandal erupts, compliance’s reports to the board establish its
bad faith and cement its liability. In this quadrant we discuss
the fiduciary duty claims against the officers of Washington Mutual, a financial company that collapsed during the 2007 financial crisis.320 Successive compliance officers submitted multiple
reports to the board pointing to legal gaps in the securitization
of mortgages. Nevertheless, the board ignored the warnings in
favor of an aggressive loan generation and securitization strategy, which ultimately landed the company in insolvency.321 The
settlement included rare out-of-pocket payments for board members, illustrating the extraordinary reach of well -documented
compliance concerns. The outcome in WaMu stands out because
compliance reports were by far the most pivotal piece of evidence
against the board.
Often, the record of communications between the board and
legal and compliance personnel is not as clear as in the two quadrants on the left. In the upper right quadrant, titled “interrupted,” reports of violations by low level employees, or indications of important gaps in the company’s compliance systems
have reached legal and compliance heads, who must then choose
how to react. Whether out of loyalty or due to mere negligence,
legal and compliance officers might be inclined to address the
problem themselves without elevating it to the board. In doing
so, they run the risk of a crisis erupting in their hands. In Yahoo’s case, the internal investigation exculpated the board by
confirming that it was kept in the dark by its chief legal officer.
It is widely thought that the chief legal officer discussed the
problem with top executives and board members informally, but
never submitted a written report.322 Not only did the chief legal
officer lose his job, but he is the target of lawsuits and enforcement actions. Regardless of the legal officer’s motivations in Yahoo, the outcome illustrates that shielding the board by formally
withholding information from it is a strategy that can easily
backfire for heads of legal and compliance departments.
320. See infra Part V.B.
321. See infra Part V.B.
322. See infra notes 362–64 and accompanying text.
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In the bottom right quadrant, titled “incomplete,” compliance and legal officers fail to fully grasp the potentially disastrous consequences of sitting on top of sensitive information. Although both compliance and legal officers and the board are
aware of problems, or of strong red flags, they fail to follow
through. The Wells Fargo fake account debacle exemplifies this
dual failure. Employees’ eagerness to fraudulently open accounts had grown so out of control that even the press had gotten
hold of it. For over two years, internal investigations resulted in
convoluted reports that both legal and compliance heads and the
board seemed to accept. The compliance machinery was seen to
be humming away, but the results were toothless, as critics
would have feared. Yet, once the extent of the misconduct was
revealed—causing public outrage, and driving customer satisfaction and share price to the ground—both management and compliance officers became targets of shareholder lawsuits and regulatory actions.323 Overall, the outcome at Wells Fargo seems to
suggest that a less than rigorous examination of red flags might
end up engulfing both the board and legal and compliance personnel in liability.
A. QUADRANT NO. 1 – UNTRACEABLE: GENERAL MOTORS
In 2014–2015, the iconic American car manufacturer General Motors recalled 30.4 million vehicles in the United States
and around the world for defects.324 The most serious defect was
a faulty ignition switch that caused vehicles to turn off while in
motion, and prevented brakes and airbags from deploying, leading to at least 124 deaths and 275 injuries.325 As a result, GM
was investigated by the U.S. Attorney’s Office, Congress, and the
SEC, and attorneys general in all fifty states.326 It also defended
323. Although litigation regarding this case is still pending, early judicial
rulings suggest that the case against management and compliance personnel
has some merit, see infra text accompanying notes 395–97.
324. See Neal E. Boudette, Supreme Court Rebuffs G.M.’s Bid to Limit Ignition-Switch Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/04/24/business/supreme-court-general-motors-ignition-flaw-suits.html;
Chris Isidore, GM’s Total Recall Cost: $4.1 Billion, CNN BUS. (Feb. 4, 2015),
https://money.cnn.com/2015/02/04/news/companies/gm-earnings-recall-costs/
index.html.
325. See Mike Spector & Christopher M. Matthews, GM Admits to Criminal
Wrongdoing, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2015, at B1; Jonathan Stempel, GM Settles
Hundreds of Ignition Switch Lawsuits, REUTERS (June 23, 2017), https://www
.reuters.com/article/us-gm-recall-settlement/gm-settles-hundreds-of-ignition
-switch-lawsuits-idUSKBN19E25A.
326. See GM Confirms Justice, SEC Probes on Ignition Recalls, NBC NEWS

2019]

HIDDEN POWER OF COMPLIANCE

2195

itself against hundreds of lawsuits.327 GM has ended up paying
billions in settlements and compensation for accident victims.328
The General Counsel at the time was Michael Millikin, whose
work at GM spanned forty years.329 Despite the scale of the scandal, there is no traceable evidence that Millikin had knowledge
of any red flags until after the cars were recalled in 2014.330 The
General Counsel’s lack of knowledge protected him from liability, and also shielded the board from these red flags.331
The report of the independent investigation revealed that,
as early as 2005, some GM lawyers knew that the ignition switch
in the Cobalt could stall while in motion, which posed a risk of
injury or death.332 In 2005, even automotive journalists began to
write stories about the Cobalt stalling when drivers moved their
keys.333 A senior inside lawyer, William Kemp, managed this
line of cases and settlements.334 Conveniently, GM’s policies only
required that he seek the General Counsel’s approval for settlements exceeding $5 million.335 Kemp settled most of the cases at
or below that level, and thus Millikin and the board remained
uninformed.336 In 2007, Kemp received two crash studies related
to airbag malfunctions, which concluded that the ignition switch
failures and the airbag failures were linked.337 But there was no
(Apr. 24 2014), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/gm-recall/gm-confirms
-justice-sec-probes-ignition-recalls-n88976; see also Press Release, Del. Dep’t of
Justice, 50 Attorneys General Reach $120 Million Settlement With General Motors Over Defective Ignition Switch (Oct. 20, 2017), https://news.delaware
.gov/2017/10/20/gm.
327. See Stempel, supra note 325.
328. See Joseph B. White, $2.4 Billion, 29 Million Cars: The Numbers Behind GM’s Year of Recalls, WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2014), https://blogs.wsj.com/
corporate-intelligence/2014/07/24/2-4-billion-29-million-cars-the-numbers
-behind-gms-year-of-recalls.
329. See Jerry Hirsch, Embattled General Motors General Counsel Millikin
to Retire, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/autos/la
-fi-hy-gm-lawyer-millikin-retires-20141017-story.html.
330. See VALUKAS REPORT, supra note 34, at 227 (noting that Millikin did
not learn about the ignition switch’s safety threat until after the recall was issued in 2014).
331. See id. at 233 (noting that the Board was unaware of the ignition switch
safety threat until 2014).
332. See id. at 103.
333. See id. at 7 (noting that newspapers, such as the New York Times, began covering these stories).
334. See id. at 85.
335. See id. at 107.
336. See id. at 231.
337. See id. at 125 (noting that the legal team was made aware of the cases
and reports in 2007).
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follow-up. Kemp finally advised Milliken of these safety issues
in 2014, after GM had already decided to recall the faulty cars.338
At that point, Mary Barra, the CEO, fired Kemp and three other
GM lawyers for concealing this information.339 But Barra, to the
frustration of the general public and Congress, stood by Millikin
and insisted that he was “a trusted and respected confidant to
senior management.”340
If there were indeed any informal communications between
Millikin and the lawyers, they remained untraceable. Shareholders brought derivative suits under Delaware fiduciary laws,
as we have discussed above.341 Even with the help of discovery,
shareholders were unable to trace any other communications.
Thus, they faulted the board for maintaining siloed and bureaucratic compliance departments.342 Regardless, the Court found
that this did not amount to bad faith.343 As a result, in subsequent cases, such as the Wells Fargo case which we discuss below,344 boards point to siloed and bureaucratic compliance regimes as a defense. But our next case study, Washington
Mutual, describes the exact opposite scenario.
B. QUADRANT NO. 2 – TRACEABLE: WAMU
Back in March 2005, the extraordinary boom in housing
prices captivated the nation’s imagination.345 Among the easiest
loans to access were Adjustable-Rate Mortgages (ARMs), whose
interest rate was low for an initial “teaser” period (up to five

338. See id. at 224 (“In the same period, Kemp disclosed the Ignition Switch
issue to Millikin for the first time.”).
339. See Bill Vlasic, G.M. Layers Hid Fatal Flaw from Critics and One Another, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/07/
business/gm-lawyers-hid-fatal-flaw-from-critics-and-one-another.html (noting
that Kemp orchestrated G.M.’s legal strategy).
340. See Press Release, General Motors, Millikin to Retire as GM General
Counsel (Oct. 17, 2014), http://media.gm.com/media/us/en/gm/news.detail.html/
content/Pages/news/us/en/2014/Oct/1017-millikin.html; see also Bill Vlasic &
Aaron M. Kessler, At Hearing on G.M. Recall, Mary Barra Gives Little Ground,
N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/18/business/
senate-hearing-on-general-motors.html.
341. See supra Part II.A.
342. See In re Gen. Motors Co. Derivative Litig., No. CV 9627-VCG, 2015 WL
3958724, at *16 (Del. Ch. June 6, 2015).
343. Id.
344. See infra Part V.D.
345. See S&P/Case-Schiller U.S. National Home Price Index, FED. RES.
BANK ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CSUSHPINSA (last updated
Mar. 26, 2019).
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years usually) but rose significantly thereafter.346 Since many
mortgage holders would have difficulty repaying the post-teaser
rate, they would likely refinance before that time.347 Many banks
offered ARMs, but few were more invested in them than WaMu,
then the sixth-largest bank in the United States.348 WaMu’s key
strategy was to offer “option-ARMs” that allows borrowers to pay
nothing in capital and even less than the interest on the loan at
times.349 When it collapsed, in September 2008, WaMu became
the largest bank failure in U.S. history, and one of the major
events of the financial crisis.350
Both regulators and shareholders tried various legal channels to hold corporate boards accountable for their actions leading to and during the financial crisis. Many of these actions
failed to bring satisfactory results, causing widespread frustration, because U.S. laws generally seek to protect corporate
board’s risk-taking prerogatives.351 But in WaMu’s case, defendant board members not only agreed to an over $64 million dollar
settlement, but also, in an extremely rare move, consented to
three board members paying out-of-pocket sums to plaintiffs.352
While insurance proceeds covered the bulk of the settlement
amount, over $25 million was paid individually by the defendant
directors.353
346. See Lisa Prevost, The Siren Call of the Adjustable-Rate Loan, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/25/realestate/the-siren
-call-of-the-adjustable-rate-loan.html (“The renewed appeal of ARMs lies in the
teaser rates offered in the opening years of the loan.”).
347. See James Berman, The Adjustable Rate Mortgage: Just Say No, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 7, 2013), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-berman/
adjustable-rate-mortgage_b_2593671.html (noting that people would try to refinance into a fixed rate when mortgage rates rose).
348. See WASH. FOSTER SCH. BUS., WAMU’S OPTION-ARM STRATEGY 1–2,
[hereinafter WAMU’S OPTION-ARM STRATEGY], http://faculty.washington.edu/
rbowen/cases/WaMu_case_10_08.pdf; Eric Dash & Andrew R. Sorkin, Government Seizes WaMu and Sells Some Assets, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2008), http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/09/26/business/26wamu.html.
349. See WAMU’S OPTION-ARM STRATEGY, supra note 348, at 2.
350. See Gretchen Morgenson, Slapped Wrists at WaMu, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/business/in-a-wamu-settlement
-with-the-fdic-slapped-wrists.html.
351. See In re Citigroup, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 125
(Del. Ch. 2009) (discussing the “business judgment rule,” which gives protection
“designed to allow corporate managers and directors to pursue risky transactions without the specter of being held personally liable if those decisions turn
out poorly”).
352. See LaCroix, supra note 38.
353. See Press Release, FDIC, WaMu D&O Settlement Summary (Dec. 15,
2011), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2011/pr11192a.html.
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What helped plaintiffs succeed in WaMu were the repeated
attempts by WaMu’s risk compliance officer to alert the board
about problems in assessing the risk profile of WaMu’s loans.354
In a series of internal memos to the CEO, the CFO, and other
officers, presentations to the board, and written reports, the risk
officer underlined the problems arising from a hasty, disorderly,
and indiscriminate loan granting process.355 As a result, compliance officers claimed, the risk profile of loans granted could be
higher than anticipated, placing the bank in dire straits in the
event of a change in market conditions.356 Incredibly, by 2007,
WaMu had already run through nine chief compliance officers in
just seven years.357
Though drafted as risk warnings, the statements by WaMu’s
compliance officers also had clear legal consequences. They immediately raised indisputable red flags that alerted the board
multiple times and in no uncertain terms, to the carelessness of
the bank’s loan granting machine.358 Upon receiving such warnings, the board should have shown appropriate care by responding to risk officers’ concerns in some manner. Perhaps they could
have ordered a review of loan granting processes. Perhaps they
could have curtailed the discretion of loan granting officers
somewhat. Perhaps they could have hired an external firm to
conduct an audit of their risk office function. Instead, the board,
believing in the CEO’s goal of expanding WaMu’s loan portfolio,
did nothing. Plaintiffs argued that this amounted to a violation
of the board’s fiduciary duties of care and loyalty towards shareholders.359
C. QUADRANT NO. 3 – INTERRUPTED: YAHOO
Few cases illuminate the inescapable conflict of interest between the board and the General Counsel more sharply than the
354. Complaint for Gross Negligence, Negligence, Breach of Fiduciary Duty,
Fraudulent Conveyance and Injunctive Relief at ¶¶ 2, 32–34, 45, 51, 58, 172,
(W.D. Wash. Mar. 16, 2011), FDIC v. Killenger, No. 2:11-cv-00459, 2011 WL
4440410 [hereinafter WaMu Complaint].
355. Id. (noting that there were continuous warnings given by WaMu’s internal risk managers regarding the lending spree and risk strategy).
356. Id. at ¶ 45.
357. See Steven Pearlstein, “The Lost Bank: The Story of Washington Mutual” by Kirsten Grind, WASH. POST (July 21, 2012), https://www.washington
post.com/opinions/the-lost-bank-the-story-of-washington-mutual-by
-kirstengrind/2012/07/20/gJQAsPoQ0W_story.html?utm_term=.e50ae0581cb6.
358. See WaMu Complaint, supra note 354, ¶¶ 25–30.
359. See WaMu Complaint, supra note 354, ¶ 195.
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Yahoo data security breach debacle. Yahoo has now disclosed
that between 2013 and 2014 all of its 3 billion user accounts were
hacked, representing the largest data security breach in history
by a wide margin.360 The immensely valuable personal information that was stolen, such as names, birthdates, and security
passwords, is currently being bought and sold on “the dark web,”
an area of the internet used for espionage and criminal activity.361 When the board finally disclosed the breaches in late 2016,
it claimed that it never received any information that constituted red flags.362 Unlike in GM, Yahoo’s Chief Legal Officer
Ronald Bell was in the know, but allegedly failed to elevate the
issue to the Board, thus establishing a pattern of interrupted
communications.363 The board then publically fired Bell and announced his resignation without pay in Yahoo’s 2016 10-K.364
1. The Biggest Data Security Breach in History
Yahoo was founded in 1995 and rode the dot-com bubble to
a market capitalization of over $125 billion by 2000.365 In 2008,
Yahoo was at its heyday and declined Microsoft’s unsolicited
$44.6 billion acquisition offer.366 But by 2015 its revenues had
dwindled and it was preparing to be acquired by Verizon for an
original offer of $4.8 billion.367 Trouble for Yahoo continued when
on September 22, 2016, during acquisition talks with Verizon, it
360. See Taylor Armerding, The 17 Biggest Data Breaches of the 21st Century, CSO ONLINE (Jan. 26, 2018), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/
data-breach/the-biggest-data-breaches-of-the-21st-century.html; Yahoo Provides Notice, supra note 6.
361. See Vindu Goel & Nicole Perlroth, Hacked Yahoo Data Is for Sale on
Dark Web, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/15/
technology/hacked-yahoo-data-for-sale-dark-web.html.
362. Id. (noting that Yahoo claimed it did not know of the breach until enforcement authorities went to the company).
363. See Yahoo 2016 10-K, supra note 40, at 46–47 (“The Committee found
that the relevant legal team had sufficient information to warrant substantial
further inquiry in 2014, although they did not sufficiently pursue it.”).
364. See id. at 47.
365. See Myles Udland, This Chart of Yahoo’s Market Cap Is Just the Most
Outrageous Thing, BUS. INSIDER (July 25, 2016), http://www.businessinsider
.com/yahoo-market-cap-over-time-2016-7.
366. See Miguel Helft & Andrew R. Sorkin, Microsoft Withdraws Bid for Yahoo, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/04/technology/
04soft.html.
367. See Brian Solomon, Yahoo Sells to Verizon in Saddest $5 Billion Deal
in Tech History, FORBES (July 25, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
briansolomon/2016/07/25/yahoo-sells-to-verizon-for-5-billion-marissa-mayer/#
4e4d70d3450f.
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announced that at least 500 million of its accounts were hacked
in late 2014 by “a state-sponsored actor.”368 The U.S. Justice Department indicted two Russian intelligence officers in March
2017, marking the first time that federal prosecutors brought cybercrime charges against Russian government officials.369 According to the indictment,370 the Russian government used information it obtained through the hack to spy on targets in the
United States, including officials in the White House and U.S.
military.371 Yahoo’s valuation took an immediate hit and Verizon
dropped its offer by $350 million,372 closing on June 8, 2017 at
$4.48 billion.373 But four months later, in October 2017, Yahoo
tripled its earlier estimate and revealed all three billion of its
user accounts had been hacked.374
2. The Independent Investigation Blames the Chief Legal
Officer for Interrupted Communication
In its 2017 public disclosures, Yahoo pointed the finger at
its Chief Legal Officer Ronald Bell and stated he failed to disclose “red flags” to the board. Yahoo’s 2017 10-K states,
[T]he Committee found that the relevant legal team had sufficient information to warrant substantial further inquiry in 2014, and they did
not sufficiently pursue it. As a result, the 2014 Security Incident was
not properly investigated and analyzed at the time, and the Company
was not adequately advised with respect to the legal and business risks
associated with the 2014 Security Incident.375

The disclosures emphasized the board’s lack of knowledge: “[t]he
368. See An Important Message to Yahoo Users on Security, BUS. WIRE (Sept.
22, 2016), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160922006198/en/
Important-Message-Yahoo-Users-Security.
369. See Vindu Goel & Eric Lichtblau, Russian Agents Were Behind Yahoo
Hack, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/
03/15/technology/yahoo-hack-indictment.html.
370. See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, U.S. Charges Russian FSB Officers and Their Criminal Conspirators for Hacking Yahoo and Millions of Email
Accounts (Mar. 15, 2017), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-russian-fsb
-officers-and-their-criminal-conspirators-hacking-yahoo-and-millions.
371. See id. (noting that the hackers went after Russian and U.S. government officials, Russian journalists, and large commercial entities).
372. See Yahoo 2016 10-K, supra note 40, at 131; Vindu Goel, Verizon Will
Pay $350 Million Less for Yahoo, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2017), http://www
.nytimes.com/2017/02/21/technology/verizon-will-pay-350-million-less-for
-yahoo.html.
373. See Press Release, Verizon, Verizon to Acquire Yahoo’s Operating Business (July 25, 2016), http://www.verizon.com/about/news/verizon-acquire
-yahoos-operating-business.
374. See Yahoo Provides Notice, supra note 6.
375. See Yahoo 2016 10-K, supra note 40, at 47.
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Independent Committee also found that the Audit and Finance
Committee and the full Board were not adequately informed of
the full severity, risks, and potential impacts of the 2014 Security Incident and related matters.”376 As a result, the CEO’s compensation was docked, but Bell was signaled out as the only employee who would lose his job. In case there was any doubt, the
disclosures publicly shamed Bell, stating that, “[n]o payments
are being made to Mr. Bell in connection with his resignation.”377
Bell’s public and apparently forced resignation triggered an outcry in the legal community.378 Fellow general counsels from technology giants like Twitter tweeted their support for Bell, and local technology newspapers published stories with headlines like,
“Silicon Valley GCs Defend Ron Bell; Say He’s The Fall Guy.”379
3. Plaintiffs Challenge the Board’s Account of Interrupted
Communication
The impact on Yahoo was swift and severe, and is ongoing.
Yahoo is the subject of federal, state, and even foreign investigations by regulatory bodies including the SEC, FTC, U.S. Attorney, and various state Attorneys General.380 In addition, Yahoo
faces a storm of litigation brought by consumers—a staggering
forty-three consumer class actions.381 Angered by the extent of
harm to the company, investors have also attempted to hold the
board accountable. Shareholders have brought federal securities

376. See id.
377. See id.
378. Twitter’s general counsel Vijaya Gadde tweeted, “I don’t know what
happened at Yahoo but I know it’s easy to blame the lawyers . . . I also know
that Ron Bell is a good lawyer.” Vijaya Gadde (@vijaya), TWITTER (Mar. 1, 2017,
3:58 PM), https://twitter.com/vijaya/status/837089571074519040?lang=en.
Scott Moore, a former Senior Vice President at Yahoo also tweeted, “Ridiculous.
I know @ronsbell_tech who is a good man and as a lawyer he wasn’t in charge
of security @Yahoo #lame CYA move @marissamayer.” Scott Moore
(@scottm00re), TWITTER (Mar. 1, 2017, 4:25 PM), https://twitter.com/
scottm00re/status/837096533669523456.
379. See Ruiz, supra note 44.
380. Aruna Viswanatha & Robert McMillan, Yahoo Faces SEC Probe Over
Data Breaches, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/yahoo
-faces-sec-probe-over-data-breaches-1485133124.
381. See Vindu Goel, Yahoo’s Top Lawyer Resigns and C.E.O. Marissa Mayer
Loses Bonus in Wake of Hack, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www
.nytimes.com/2017/03/01/technology/yahoo-hack-lawyer-resigns-ceo-bonus
.html.
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claims under both 10(b) and 20(a)382 and filed derivative actions
for fiduciary duty violations in both Delaware and California.383
The allegations in the complaints are heavily focused on the
existence, adequacy, and frequency of written communication
between inside legal counsel and the board. Some plaintiffs384
allege that the board attempted to avoid liability by ensuring
that the communication between the board and the legal department would remain interrupted. For example, they claim that
that Yahoo “did not maintain minutes” for meetings where the
data breaches were discussed, “failed to document the discussions” they had about the breaches, and engaged in “active attempts to not document the most incriminating information the
Board discussed.”385 Other plaintiffs opted to include Bell as a
defendant on the theory that he breached his fiduciary duties of
oversight and supervision by failing to protect Yahoo’s data.386
Still others point to specific machinations by Ronald Bell and the
board including the use of code names such as “Siberia” in
memos prepared by the legal department to refer to the
breaches.387
To sum up, there is a familiar pattern in these and numerous other cases pending against Yahoo. Plaintiffs, whether investors or users, are trying to penetrate the shield of interrupted
communication that the board is using as a defense. Some plaintiffs base their claim on evidence of the chief legal counsel’s apparent knowledge and target him directly for not actively reacting. Other plaintiffs do not name Bell at all, but attempt to
reveal how the board was using him as a liability shield. Regardless of these differences, the outcome of these cases will rest on
whether the information between legal and the Board in fact remained interrupted.

382. See Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial ¶¶ 165–66, Spain v. Mayer,
No. 17CV307054 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara Cty. Ct. Mar. 7, 2017) [hereinafter
Complaint, Spain v. Mayer] (discussing the derivative claim and futility).
383. See id.; Complaint, Okla. Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys. v. Brandt,
C.A. No. 2017-0133-SG (Del. Ch. filed Feb. 23, 2017) [hereinafter Complaint,
Okla. Firefighters].
384. See Complaint, Okla. Firefighters, supra note 383, ¶¶ 9–12.
385. Id. ¶¶ 12, 116.
386. See Complaint, Spain v. Mayer, supra note 382, ¶ 40.
387. Amended Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial ¶ 104, In re Yahoo! Inc.
Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., Nos. 16-MD-02752, 5:16-CV-06990, (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 19, 2016), 2016 WL 9710969.
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D. QUADRANT NO. 4 – INCOMPLETE: WELLS FARGO
While Wells Fargo was one of the few major banks to have
emerged from the financial crisis on a white horse, its currently
unfolding fake account scandal reflects some of the darkest days
in banking history. Wells Fargo has now admitted to opening an
eye-popping 3.5 million fake bank accounts by forging client signatures.388 The Los Angeles Times broke the story of Wells
Fargo’s “relentless pressure to sell” in 2013, exposing the scandal.389 The bank has already paid upwards of $185 million in
fines to various regulatory bodies,390 suffered what some have
estimated to be a forty percent relative hit to its stock price,391
and it continues to battle private lawsuits and pay settlements
to the tune of over $140 million.392 Perhaps the biggest hit came
on February 2, 2018, when the Federal Reserve restricted
growth by assets until Wells Fargo improved its risk assessment
and governance, effectively prohibiting it from taking net additional deposits.393 The Federal Reserve also pushed for, without
directly mandating, the resignation of any Wells Fargo’s board
members who had served during the scandal and still remained
on the board.394
Given the scale of the scandal, it is no surprise that shareholders took aim at the board and executives, and brought a
shareholder derivative action in February 2017.395 The action
has survived a motion to dismiss and Wells Fargo directors and
officers are now defending against both Delaware fiduciary duty
388. Laura J. Keller, Wells Fargo Boosts Fake-Account Estimate 67% to 3.5
Million, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-08-31/wells-fargo-increases-fake-account-estimate-67-to-3-5
-million.
389. See Reckard, supra note 45.
390. See Matt Levine, Wells Fargo Opened a Couple Million Fake Accounts,
BLOOMBERG: OPINION (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/
articles/2016-09-09/wells-fargo-opened-a-couple-million-fake-accounts.
391. See John Maxfield, Chart: The Cost of Wells Fargo’s Sales Scandal, THE
MOTLEY FOOL (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/09/06/chart
-the-cost-of-wells-fargos-sales-scandal.aspx.
392. See David Ng, Judge Approves $142-Million Class-Action Settlement in
Wells Fargo Sham Accounts Scandal, L.A. TIMES (July 9, 2017), http://www
.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-fargo-settlement-20170709-story.html.
393. Emily Flitter et al., Federal Reserve Shackles Wells Fargo After Fraud
Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/02/
business/wells-fargo-federal-reserve.html.
394. See id.
395. See Consolidated Amended Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, In re
Wells Fargo & Co. S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 3:16-CV-05541, (N.D. Cal. Feb.
4, 2017), 2017 WL 1044785.
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and federal security law claims.396 In allowing the case to proceed, the court cited “red flags” that included communications
between employees and board members, multiple lawsuits, employee terminations, and the L.A. Times articles.397 As we discuss below, information about fraudulent sales practices first
reached the legal and compliance personnel at Wells Fargo, and
then the board itself at various times over the last five years.398
But instead of getting to the bottom of the problem, legal and
compliance personnel opted for incomplete communications to
the board.399 Though officially displeased, the board did not take
further action on the ground until the scandal was revealed.
1. Legal and Compliance Personnel Become Aware of
Problems
In determining how much information about the scandal
reached the board, the actions of Michael Loughlin, the Chief
Risk Officer (CRO) who led compliance, and James Strother, the
General Counsel (GC), were instrumental. Though neither had
the authority to enforce changes to the bank’s practices on the
ground, they both sat on the bank’s Executive Risk Management
Committee (ERMC), tasked with reporting, evaluating, and escalating issues to the Board.400 The committee met monthly and
advised the board quarterly.401 Dating to as far back as 2002,
Wells Fargo’s low-level lawyers and compliance officers had encountered sales integrity issues, but failed to escalate them to
their respective heads because they viewed them as minor
risks.402 By 2012, Loughlin was sufficiently concerned about
shady sales practices to ask bank executives for a report to the
EMRC.403 Though “very dissatisfied” with the thoroughness of
the report, the EMRC did not pursue a formal investigation.404
Instead, at Loughlin’s request, the board agreed to hire hundreds more compliance professionals and allocate considerably
more funding to the compliance function.405
396. In re Wells Fargo & Co. S’holder Derivative Litig., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1074,
1074–75 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
397. See id. at 1088.
398. WELLS FARGO INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS REPORT, supra note 46, at 15.
399. See id.
400. See id. at 60–61.
401. Id. at 61.
402. Id. at 80.
403. Id. at 64.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 63.
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2. Press Articles Raise Red Flags
In October and December 2013, the Los Angeles Times published two articles exposing an investigation by Los Angeles
County into Wells Fargo’s sales practices.406 The articles’ claims
were in line with the findings of an internal inquiry by the Enterprise Services Division, about which both the GC and CRO
were extensively briefed. With the scandal already spilling over
to the public domain, the response inside the bank would be critical for any future litigation or regulatory procedure. The legal
department chose inaction, and “did not further escalate the existence or details of the investigation to the Board or any Board
Committees at that time.”407 In contrast, the CRO initially identified sales practices as a “significant risk” in written memos to
the board in early 2014,408 but did not provide detailed information, and backtracked on the risk estimate within a year. At
the time, neither the compliance department conducted an investigation, nor did the board ask for one.409
3. Legal and Compliance Officers Opt for Incomplete
Communications
On May 4, 2015, the Los Angeles City Attorney filed a lawsuit against Wells Fargo for its sales practices, which triggered
a series of inquiries by regulatory bodies.410 This caught the attention of the board, which asked the GC and the Head of Community Banking, Carrie Tolstedt, for a presentation at their next
meeting.411 The in-house lawyers and banking executives appeared to wrangle and negotiate back and forth on the drafts of
the board presentation, eventually settling on omitting key information. The board’s risk committee was “highly critical” of the
presentation and claimed that they were “blindsided” by the fact
that as many as 230 employees were terminated because of the
sales practices.412 What the board did not know, however, was
that the curtain was lifted only a little—the actual aggregate
number of terminations was in fact closer to 1500 employees.413
406.
407.
77.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.

See, e.g., Reckard, supra note 45.
WELLS FARGO INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS REPORT, supra note 46, at 76–
Id. at 67.
Id. at 77.
Id.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 109.
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The board turned to the CRO, Loughlin, who assured the board
that he would conduct a third-party review of the sales practices,
and asked for additional resources.414 At the direction of the
board, the risk function was expanding rapidly with significantly
increased budgets and staffing. But the board did not investigate
further the immediate scandal. For most of 2016, “Board members still understood it to be mostly a Southern California problem with terminations in the range of 230.”415
In September 2016, Wells Fargo announced that it would
pay $100 million to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
the largest fine ever imposed by the agency, $35 million to the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and a $50 million settlement to Los Angeles.416 The board only learned that approximately 5300 employees had been terminated for sales practices
violations through these settlements.417 In addition to the settlements, congressional hearings led by Senator Elizabeth Warren
made headlines and delighted the general public as she grilled
Wells Fargo’s leadership.418 With the curtain now fully drawn
back, the board members were forced onto the public stage,
where they had to act immediately. They met in September, fired
Carrie Tolstedt, and rescinded CEO Stumpf’s unvested compensation and bonus.419 The board also accelerated the buildout of
its compliance department. In 2016 and 2017, over 5200 compliance employees were realigned to report to the CRO.420
Overall, the typology we offer above helps improve our understanding of how interactions between the board and its legal
and compliance officers, before a corporate failure becomes public, formulate the liability outcomes later. Although criticisms of
compliance have traditionally focused on an archetypal alignment of interests between the board and its legal and compliance
officers, we show that, although untraceable communications is
414. Id. at 70.
415. Id. at 108.
416. Press Release, CFPB, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Fines
Wells Fargo $100 Million for Widespread Illegal Practice of Secretly Opening
Unauthorized Accounts (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/
about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-fines-wells-fargo
-100-million-widespread-illegal-practice-secretly-opening-unauthorized
-accounts.
417. WELLS FARGO INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS REPORT, supra note 46, at 16.
418. See Gelles, supra note 9.
419. See WELLS FARGO INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS REPORT, supra note 46, at
9–10.
420. Id. at 12.
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a possible outcome, it is not the only one. In contrast, we illustrate a variety of strategies that legal and compliance officers
followed once in possession of incriminating information. Their
choices, and the ensuing board reaction, become the focus of
shareholder litigation after massive scandals.
CONCLUSION
Traditional corporate law theory portrays the board as the
ultimate monitor of shareholders’ interests, watching over management’s actions. But for decades, this theoretical construct
seemed to have little bite in reality, since prevailing in Caremark
claims was notoriously hard. Nowadays, Caremark plaintiffs
and regulators stand a better chance, we argue, due to the staggering growth of compliance, which can produce the evidentiary
record that opens the path toward board liability. In turn, the
power to control this evidentiary path grants chief legal and compliance officers more influence over the board. Thus, we have introduced in the corporate law debate new actors, whose incentives and motivations are instrumental in deterring corporate
wrongdoing. Below, we discuss the implications of our argument
for future research and for policymaking.
The typology we offered in Part V illustrates not only the
critical role of chief legal and compliance officers, but also the
diverse choices they make. To better grasp what leads to these
choices, further research is necessary. One potential direction in
this inquiry is the institutional makeup of compliance. Because
setting up compliance departments has been largely left to companies’ discretion, there is wide variation in structure, powers,
and resources available. For example, there is a heated debate
over whether the roles of chief legal and compliance officer
should be combined.421 This variation can be leveraged for empirical studies of successful compliance operations. Moreover,
since the influence of these corporate actors is only now becoming clear, a closer account of their experiences, interests, backgrounds, and professional goals would help us better understand
their motivations.
For policymakers, who have been key drivers behind the
compliance revolution, our analysis above shows what has been

421. See Michael Peregrine, Compliance or Legal? The Board’s Duty to Assure Clarity, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 12,
2014), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/08/12/compliance-or-legal-the
-boards-duty-to-assure-clarity.
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achieved, but also how much is still left to do. As we have discussed above, policymakers have already understood that simply
requiring companies to hire more compliance officers will not be
effective, unless accompanied by changes in governance, such as
providing a reporting avenue to the board. Professional associations, outside counsel, and other bodies are formulating best
practices for compliance operations.422 The structure of legal and
compliance oversight has become a primary focus for institutional investors, who are concerned about the potential fallout.423 For those interested in boosting board accountability, this
is a fertile ground for further intervention.
As the choices legal and compliance officers make in communicating with the board have far-reaching repercussions, policymakers might consider ways to further empower the heads of
legal and compliance departments. One such tool consists in
providing specific guidelines for how to structure reports and
identify red flags, as is the case in anti-money laundering laws.
Another boost to the standing of these officers within the corporation could come through broadening their liability for compliance failures. With the threat of legal sanctions over their heads,
legal and compliance officers might be more steadfast toward
company executives who ask them to ignore malfeasance. For
now, instances of legal and compliance professionals being held
personally liable for corporate misconduct remain rare.
Legal and compliance heads are particularly important in
moments of crisis. At these times, companies turn to their general counsel not only for managing the fallout from past wrongdoing, but also for future leadership. Too often, the capabilities
and skills of visionary CEOs are not particularly well suited to
steering the company through the tumultuous waters of corporate calamity. Sometimes, the CEOs themselves are embroiled
in crisis. Instead, chief legal and compliance officers are called
upon to reform how the company does business, behaves towards
its employees and competitors, and manages its resources. To
achieve this turnaround, companies often hire new high-profile
lawyers who are given extensive powers and resources. Following a year of successive crises, Uber CEO, Dara Khosrowshahi’s
422. See Matthew Sullivan, Research Roundup: Unpacking Ethics and Compliance with Melanie Condron of Accenture, ACC DOCKET (Mar. 31, 2017),
https://www.accdocket.com/articles/research-roundup-melanie-condron.cfm.
423. See Martin Lipton, Risk Management and the Board of Directors, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 28, 2015), https://corpgov
.law.harvard.edu/2015/07/28/risk-management-and-the-board-of-directors-3.
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first major hire was a new general counsel, Tony West, who had
gotten his previous company, Pepsi, recognized as one of the
world’s most ethical companies ten years in a row.424 Wells Fargo
recently named Allen Parker, former managing partner of Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP, to head its legal department, emphasizing his expertise in ethical leadership.425 Once the backwaters
of the legal profession, the chief legal counsel role has become
the domain of legal superstars.
These moves confirm the meteoric rise of compliance as a
core corporate function, firmly ensconced among the key duties
of the board. In the modern workplace, oversight is ubiquitous,
and violations of law have severe consequences all the way to top
management. We are only now beginning to see the muscle of
compliance in full action.
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